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Chapter 0
Introduction
This thesis consists of three chapters that examine diﬀerent aspects of frictional labor
markets in a DSGE framework. In particular, my thesis investigates the implications
of diﬀerent wage bargaining regimes, labor adjustment costs, and endogenous on-the-job
search. The third chapter represents my contribution to a joint project with Agostino
Consolo from the European Central Bank.
The ﬁrst chapter modiﬁes the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model in order to explain
the cyclical behavior of vacancies and unemployment. The modiﬁcations include strategic
wage bargaining and convex labor adjustment costs. I ﬁnd that this setup replicates the
cyclical behavior of both labor market variables remarkably well. First, I show that
the model with strategic wage bargaining matches closely the volatility of vacancies and
unemployment. Second, the introduction of convex labor adjustment costs makes both
variables much more persistent. Third, my analysis indicates that these two modiﬁcations
are complementary in generating labor market volatility and persistence.
The second chapter addresses the large degree of frictional wage dispersion found in
US data. The standard job matching model without on-the-job search cannot replicate
this pattern. With on-the-job search, however, unemployed job searchers are more willing
to accept low wage oﬀers since they can continue to seek for better employment opportu-
nities. This explains why observably identical workers may be paid very diﬀerent wages.
Therefore, I examine the quantitative implications of on-the-job search in a stochastic
job matching model. Our key result is that the inclusion of variable on-the-job search
increases the degree of frictional wage dispersion by an order of a magnitude.
The third chapter introduces staggered right-to-manage wage bargaining into a New
Keynesian business cycle model. My key result is that a reasonably calibrated version
of the model is able to generate persistent responses in output, inﬂation, and total labor
input to both neutral technology and monetary policy shocks. Furthermore, I compare
the model’s dynamic behavior when calibrated to the US and to a European economy.
I ﬁnd that the degree of price rigidity explains most of the diﬀerences in response to
a monetary policy shock. Diﬀerences in the degree of wage rigidity, instead, alter the
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dynamics of the model economy only by little. When the economy is hit by a neutral
technology shock, both price and wage rigidities turn out to be important. Apart from
that, my results indicate that matching frictions matter primarily for the dynamics of the
labor market.
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Chapter 1
Strategic Wage Bargaining, Labor
Market Volatility, and Persistence
1.1 Introduction
The Mortensen-Pissarides job search and matching model1 has become the standard
theory of equilibrium unemployment. Moreover, starting with Merz (1995), Andolfatto
(1996) and den Haan et al. (2000), several authors have shown that the inclusion of la-
bor market frictions improves the propagation mechanism of standard real-business-cycle
models considerably. Recently, however, the Mortensen-Pissarides model has come under
criticism. Following the inﬂuential work of Shimer (2005), a large literature has emerged
which has shown that the job matching model cannot replicate the cyclical behavior of
its two central variables – vacancies and unemployment.
In particular, Shimer (2005) emphasizes that the Mortensen-Pissarides model gener-
ates insuﬃcient volatility of vacancies and unemployment at the business cycle frequen-
cies. Indeed, Shimer (2005) challenges not the job search and matching approach itself,
but rather the commonly-used Nash (1953) bargaining assumption for wage determina-
tion. This approach postulates that the household and the ﬁrm divide the mutual surplus
period-by-period according to a constant sharing parameter. This implies that the wage
bill per worker is almost as elastic as the underlying productivity shock, giving ﬁrms only
little incentive to adjust the stock of employment. For this reason, Shimer (2005) proposes
to consider alternative bargaining assumptions that might deliver real wage rigidity. In a
related article, Shimer (2004) provides evidence that real wage rigidity might amplify the
volatility of vacancies and unemployment substantially.
Furthermore, Fujita (2004) demonstrates that vacancies in the Mortensen-Pissarides
are too less persistent. This artifact follows from ﬁrms’ hiring behavior in the job match-
ing model with linear vacancy posting costs. In response to a positive technology shock,
1See Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) as well as Yashiv (2007) for comprehensive surveys.
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ﬁrms anticipate the sharp and lasting rise in hiring costs and adjust employment instan-
taneously. Hence, vacancies spike on impact, but fall back half way only one period later.
Contrary to this pattern, several authors2 have found ample evidence that the impulse
response function of vacancies displays a marked hump-shape, peaking with several quar-
ters delay. Fujita and Ramey (2007) address this issue by introducing a sunk cost for
the creation of new job positions. This modiﬁcation improves the persistence of vacan-
cies remarkably. Moreover, the impulse response function of vacancies shows a distinct
hump-shape.
The main aim of this paper is to replicate the cyclical behavior of vacancies and un-
employment along both dimensions – volatility and persistence. Therefore, we modify
the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model in two ways. First, we adopt strategic wage
bargaining as introduced into the literature by Hall and Milgrom (2008). In contrast to
(static) Nash bargaining, strategic wage bargaining assumes that wages are determined
by a Rubinstein (1982) game of alternating oﬀers. This approach accounts for the dy-
namic and interactive character of wage negotiations. The main diﬀerence between Nash
bargaining and strategic wage bargaining lies in the players’ threat points. Under Nash
bargaining, both players’ threat points are determined by their respective outside alterna-
tive, i.e. the value of labor market search. Under strategic wage bargaining, however, the
prospective mutual surplus gives both players strong incentives to hold-up the bargaining
process until an agreement is reached. Thus, both players’ threat points are determined
by their respective value of bargaining. As argued by Hall and Milgrom (2008), the value
of bargaining is much less sensitive to current labor market conditions than the outside
alternative. In our benchmark model, strategic wage bargaining reduces the elasticity of
the wage bill per worker by half. As a consequence, the elasticity of the net ﬂow value of
the marginal match rises enormously, providing ﬁrms much stronger incentives to hire new
workers in economic upswings. In this way, strategic wage bargaining gives an endogenous
explanation for the observed high degree of labor market volatility.
Second, we combine strategic wage bargaining with convex labor adjustment costs as
used by Gertler and Trigari (2009). In contrast to linear vacancy posting costs, ﬁrms’
hiring costs now are determined by the number of vacancies that are ﬁlled, and not by
the number of vacancies that are posted. Further, ﬁrms’ hiring costs depend negatively
on the current employment level. This implies that marginal matching costs are no
longer a function of market tightness, but of the gross hiring rate. In contrast to market
tightness, the gross hiring rate is much less elastic and much less persistent with respect
to technology shocks. The altered behavior of marginal matching costs removes ﬁrms’
incentives to adjust employment instantaneously. Instead, the convex shape of the labor
adjustment cost function gives ﬁrms strong incentives to smooth their hiring activities.
2See Blanchard et al. (1989), Fujita (2004), Braun et al. (2006), as well as Ravn and Simonelli (2008),
among others.
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For this reason, the impulse response function of vacancies in our benchmark model shows
a pronounced hump-shape, peaking several quarters after the shock. Consequently, the
introduction of convex labor adjustment costs makes vacancies much more persistent,
conﬁrming the ﬁndings of Yashiv (2006).
Apart from that, we notice that strategic wage bargaining and convex labor adjust-
ment costs are complementary in generating labor market volatility and persistence. This
interesting result stems from the speciﬁcation of the hiring cost function. Following
Gertler and Trigari (2009), we assume that ﬁrms’ hiring costs depend negatively on the
employment level. Hence, convex labor adjustment costs open a second channel through
which strategic wage bargaining ampliﬁes labor market volatility. On the one hand, strate-
gic wage bargaining enhances the volatility of employment by reducing the elasticity of
wages. On the other hand, the larger the stock of employment, the lower are the ﬁrms’
hiring costs. As a result, the introduction of convex labor adjustment costs generates not
only more persistence, but also more volatility in the labor market.
Furthermore, we introduce the modiﬁed Mortensen-Pissarides model into a real model
of the business cycle (Andolfatto, 1996). This seems advantageous, given that this frame-
work allows for a proper calibration of the factor income shares and small (accounting)
proﬁts (Hornstein et al., 2005). As demonstrated by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008),
proﬁts have to be small in order to leverage a given productivity shock into large labor
market ﬂuctuations. In this context, Mortensen and Nagypál (2007) have shown that
the impact of strategic wage bargaining on the volatility of vacancies and unemployment
increases considerably once physical capital is considered.
Finally, we ﬁnd that our setup gives rise to two distortionary eﬀects. In the presence of
convex labor adjustment costs, social optimality requires that the wage bill per worker is
equal to the household’s outside alternative. In contrast, we assume that (i) the wage bill
per worker is independent of the ﬂuctuations in household’s outside alternative and (ii)
ﬁrms’ bargaining power is smaller than unity. This implies that ﬁrms’ private gains from
labor market search are generally smaller than their social contribution. Consequently,
the dynamic behavior of the wage bill per worker is not socially optimal (Hosios, 1990).
For this reason, we compute the market solution to our setup, based on the model of
Cheron and Langot (2004).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
environment. Section 3 calibrates the model and evaluates its quantitative performance
against U.S. data. Section 4 concludes.
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1.2 The Model Environment
1.2.1 Labor Market Flows
The Mortensen-Pissarides job search and matching model presumes that search on the
labor market is frictional. These frictions are represented by a Cobb-Douglas matching
function. This function relates aggregate job matches mt to the number of vacancies that
are posted vt and the search eﬀort of the unemployed e(1 − nt):
mt(vt,(1 − nt)) = χv
α
t (e(1 − nt))
1−α ≤ min[vt,(1 − nt)], (1.1)
where the eﬀort e > 0 (“hours”) per unemployed job searcher is taken to be constant.
The ratio between vacancies and unemployed job searchers measures the tightness of the
labor market. Moreover, we assume that the matching function is linearly homogeneous.
Hence, the vacancy ﬁlling rate q(γt) and the job ﬁnding rate q(γt)γt depend solely on the





















These ratios give the expected return on labor market search for ﬁrms and the unemployed,
respectively. One can observe that the tighter the labor market, the longer the expected
time to ﬁll a vacancy, but the shorter the expected search for a job (and vice versa).
However, households and ﬁrms do not internalize the eﬀect of their search activities on
the aggregate return rates. This behavior causes congestion externalities on both market
sides.
We assume that new job matches mt are formed at the end of each period. Simultane-
ously, a fraction of preexisting jobs is terminated. Consistent with the results of Shimer
(2007), we assume the job destruction rate σ to be constant. Consequently, the law of
motion for the aggregate employment level is given by:
nt+1 = (1 − σ)nt + mt. (1.4)
1.2.2 The Problem of the Household
The representative household consists of a continuum of individuals who insure each
other completely against idiosyncratic employment risk. The share of employed household
members, nt, works lt “hours” per period on the job while the share 1−nt (the unemployed)
searches e “hours” on the labor market. Both activities aﬀect utility negatively as they
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t ,1 − lt) = ln(c
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t ,1 − e) = ln(c
U




The parameter φi,i = 1,2 captures the fact that the valuation of leisure depends on the
employment status. Each employed household member earns the real wage rate wt per
hour lt. Hence, ntwtlt constitutes the labor income of the representative household. In
addition, households receive dividends remitted by ﬁrms πt and rental income rtkt from


















t ,1 − lt) + (1 − nt)u
U(c
U







    
,
s.t. (1.5)
kt+1 = (1 − δ + rt)kt + πt + ntwtlt − ntc
N
t − (1 − nt)c
U
t , (1.6)
nt+1 = (1 − σ)nt + q(γt)γt(1 − nt). (1.7)
Here, equation (1.6) is the budget constraint. Equation (1.7) is the law of motion for the
household’s employment share. Provided stochastic processes for
 
wt, rt, lt, πt, q(γt)γt
| t ≥ 0
 









t , kt+1 | t ≥ 0
 
that maximize its expected discounted utility.
These choices have to satisfy following ﬁrst order conditions:
c
N




t ,1 − lt), (1.8)
c
U




t ,1 − e), (1.9)
kt+1 : λt = βEt[λt+1(1 − δ + rt+1)]. (1.10)
The ﬁrst order conditions (1.8) and (1.9) show that perfect income insurance against
idiosyncratic employment risk allocates the same consumption level to employed and
unemployed workers. Equation (1.10) gives the familiar Euler equation for consumption.
1.2.3 The Problem of the Firm
Output is produced by ﬁrms that use capital kt and labor hours (ntlt) as input factors.
The production function is taken to be Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale. This
implies that the model has a representative ﬁrm. We assume that total factor productivity
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at is subject to an exogenous shock speciﬁed by the following autoregressive process:
ln(at) = (1 − ρ)ln(¯ a) + ρln(at−1) + ǫt, with ǫt ∼ N(0,σ
2
ǫ) and iid. (1.11)
The speciﬁcation of the ﬁrm’s cost function follows Gertler and Trigari (2009). The









In contrast to the standard speciﬁcation,3 labor adjustment costs are determined by the
squared number of new job matches m2
t, the employment level nt, and a constant scale pa-
rameter κ/2.4 Consequently, ﬁrms’ labor adjustment costs are determined by the number
of vacancies that are ﬁlled, and not by the number of vacancies that are posted. In other
words, vacancy posting per se is costless. In addition, notice that ﬁrms take the aggregate
vacancy ﬁlling rate q(γt) as given. Hence, from the perspective of the representative ﬁrm,
the number of new job matches mt = q(γt)vt is linear in vacancies.
Moreover, we assume that the representative ﬁrm is large in the sense that it has
many workers, and that it is large enough to eliminate all uncertainty about nt+1. This
ensures that all ﬁrms in the model remain of the same size (Rotemberg, 2006). However,
the representative ﬁrm in our model is small in the sense that it is competitive. For this
reason, the ﬁrm takes not only the aggregate vacancy ﬁlling rate, but also the wage bill






Thus, the representative ﬁrm’s problem can be formulated as:
V(Ω
F
t ) = max
kt,vt
 



















nt+1 = (1 − σ)nt + q(γt)vt. (1.15)
Given stochastic processes for
 
at, wt, rt, lt, q(γt) | t ≥ 0
 
and an initial condition for n0,
the representative ﬁrm chooses contingency plans
 
kt, vt, nt+1 | t ≥ 0
 
that maximize the
3See Appendix 1.A.1 for the ﬁrm’s problem with linear vacancy posting costs ψ(vt) = κvt.
4Several recent studies (Nilsen et al., 2007; King and Thomas, 2006; Merz and Yashiv, 2007) provide
evidence for the empirical relevance of convex adjustment cost functions at the macro level.
5In words, the representative ﬁrm does not internalize the impact of its hiring activities on the expected
wage bill per worker (∂wt+1lt+1)/(∂nt+1) = 0. Nevertheless, the ﬁrm anticipates the future wage bill per
worker wt+1lt+1 correctly. See Section 1.2.5 for more information.
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expected present value of the dividend ﬂow. The ﬁrst order conditions are given as:

















t+1 + (1 − σ)κxt+1
  
, (1.17)
where the gross hiring rate mt/nt is denoted by xt. Equation (1.16) shows the familiar
relation between the real interest rate and the marginal product of capital under perfectly
competitive capital markets. The hiring condition (1.17) states that the representative
ﬁrm posts the optimal number of job vacancies vt that equalizes expected marginal hiring
costs κxt (the left hand side) with the expected present value of the marginal match in the
future (the right hand side). The expected present value of the marginal match depends
on the marginal product per worker (1−θ)(yt+1/nt+1), the expected wage bill per worker
wt+1lt+1, expected savings on adjustment costs (κ/2)x2
t+1, and expected savings on hiring
costs (1 − σ)κxt+1. Savings on adjustment costs capture the fact that each marginal
match increases the stock of employment in the next period, irrespective of when the
match is terminated. On the contrary, savings on hiring costs are only realized if the
match survives the following period.
1.2.4 The Resource Constraint
The following equation gives the resource constraint of our economy. The resource con-
straint postulates that output is divided into consumption, gross investment and labor
adjustment costs:









Frictions in the labor market create a prospective mutual surplus between ﬁrm-worker
matches. This surplus equals the value added of the match compared to the payoﬀ of
both parties in the labor market. Following Pissarides (2000, chapter 3), we assume that
the wage bill per worker wtlt is determined for each match separately while wages in all
other matches are taken as given. Hence, the relevant surplus share of the household and
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The surplus share of the household W2(ΩH
t ) equals the diﬀerence between the value of
employment and the value of unemployment.6 The value of employment is made up of
the sum of the wage bill per worker and household’s expected present value of the match
in the future. The value of unemployment, i.e. household’s outside alternative, consists
of the current utility gain from leisure and household’s continuation payoﬀ from labor
market search. The surplus of the ﬁrm V1(ΩF
t ) is composed of (i) the marginal product
per worker, (ii) the wage bill per worker, (iii) savings on adjustment costs, and (iv) the
expected present value of the match in the future. A non-arbitrage condition ensures that
the outside alternative of the ﬁrm (i.e. the ex-ante value of an unﬁlled vacancy) is zero.
The sum of the marginal product per worker, i.e. the marginal product per “hour” F2,t
times “hours worked” ht, and savings on adjustment costs (κ/2)x2
t is deﬁned as gross ﬂow
value of the marginal match. Given that the weight of the marginal match is small, both
parties take the gross ﬂow value of the marginal match as given during the bargaining
process.
Thus, the mutual surplus St of the marginal ﬁrm-worker match (in units of the con-
sumption good) is given as the sum of the two shares:
St = (W2(Ω
H
t )/λt) + V1(Ω
F
t ). (1.21)
The allocation of the mutual surplus between the household and the ﬁrm determines
the wage bill per worker wtlt. In order to satisfy individual rationality, the equilibrium
wage bill per worker has to make each party at least indiﬀerent between accepting the
contract and the forgone outside alternative of continued labor market search. We obtain
the reservation wage bill (per worker) of the household and the ﬁrm, respectively, by
setting the surplus share equal to zero. Equation (1.19) shows that the reservation wage
bill of the household (wl)min is given by the value of unemployment less household’s




















   
.
(1.22)
Analogously, the reservation wage bill of the ﬁrm (wl)max is deﬁned as the gross ﬂow value
of the marginal match plus ﬁrm’s expected present value of the marginal match in the
future:7
















7Note that ﬁrms treat hiring costs as sunk. Hence, a ﬁrm would generate negative proﬁts if it accepted
a wage bill per worker close to (wtlt)max (Hall and Milgrom, 2008). However, this possibility is ruled out
by our calibration.
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These two reservation wage bills constitute the lower and the upper bound of the bar-
gaining set which contains all feasible wage bills (Malcomson, 1999). In other words, the
equilibrium value of the wage bill per worker is indeterminate. Therefore, we assume
that wages are determined by an ex-post bargaining game between the household and
the ﬁrm. In particular, we consider two alternative approaches – standard Nash (1953)
bargaining and a Rubinstein (1982) game of alternating oﬀers. In addition, the wage bill
per worker is subject to continuous renegotiation whenever new information arrives. In
our discrete-time model, this implies that new matches are formed at the end of each
period. However, bargaining does not start until the beginning of the next period when
the new state of technology can be observed.
The Optimal Wage Contract
For the standard job search and matching model (with linear vacancy posting costs),
Hosios (1990) has established a necessary and suﬃcient condition under which both con-
gestion externalities just oﬀset one another.8 As mentioned above, the congestion exter-
nalities arise from the fact that ﬁrms take the aggregate vacancy ﬁlling rate q(γt) as given
when deciding upon the optimal number of vacancies vt. Thus, from the ﬁrm’s perspec-
tive, the number of new job matches mt = q(γt)vt is linear in vacancies. Accordingly, the




In contrast, the social planner solution accounts for the fact that new job matches are
a concave function of vacancies (see equation 1.1). Hence, the social planner internalizes
that the vacancy ﬁlling rate decreases in the number of posted vacancies. Therefore, the
marginal vacancy yields following social beneﬁt (see Appendix 1.A.2):
κ = αq(γt)St. (1.25)
Social optimality requires that ﬁrms’ private gains from search eﬀort equals their social
beneﬁt. Consequently, ﬁrms’ incentives to post vacancies are eﬃcient if and only if
V1(Ω
F
t ) = αSt (1.26)
holds. In words, the Hosios condition postulates that the private gain per match equals
the share α of the mutual surplus St per match.
In contrast, if ﬁrms internalized the congestion eﬀect on the aggregate vacancy ﬁlling
rate correctly, social optimality would require ﬁrms to gain the entire mutual surplus per
8Merz (1995) has generalized the Hosios condition for dynamic models.
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t ) = St. (1.27)
However, if ﬁrms gained the entire mutual surplus, even though they did not internalize
the congestion eﬀects, the private gains from the marginal vacancy would be larger than
the social beneﬁt. Thus, ﬁrms would have an incentive to “over-hire”. In order to avoid
the over-hiring eﬀect, the Hosios condition requires that ﬁrms gain only the share α of
the mutual surplus per match.
Under convex labor adjustment costs, on the contrary, ﬁrms’ hiring costs depend on
the number of vacancies that are ﬁlled q(γt)vt, and not on the number of vacancies that are
posted vt. Consequently, the congestion externalities bias not only ﬁrms’ private gains, but
also – to the same extent – ﬁrms’ hiring costs. This removes ﬁrms’ incentives to over-hire,
even if they gained the entire mutual surplus per match. Under these circumstances, the
congestion externalities exactly oﬀset each other if and only if the entire mutual surplus
per match accrues to the ﬁrms (see Appendix 1.A.3), i.e. if equation (1.27) holds.
Nash Bargaining
Nash bargaining has become the standard method for wage determination in job matching
models. This approach postulates a number of axioms and derives a unique equilibrium
sharing rule for the mutual surplus. In addition, Nash (1953) proves that exactly the
same solution can be generated by a simultaneous one-shot game. This bargaining game
presumes that both parties threaten each other to terminate the bargain unilaterally
rather than to conclude an agreement. Subsequently, both parties reveal their demands
simultaneously. If these demands are not compatible, the match is broken up and both
players gain only their respective outside alternative, i.e. they return to labor market
search. However, given perfect information and rational players, Nash (1953) shows that













where the original version assumes symmetric bargaining power (ξ = 1/2). The general-
ized version, however, allows any value for ξ in the interval (0,1].9 Hence, the solution
to our model is given by the wage bill per worker which maximizes the weighted product
of both parties’ surplus shares. This sharing rule allocates period-by-period a constant







= (1 − ξ)V1(Ω
F
t ). (1.29)
Thus, in the case of linear vacancy posting costs, the Nash solution generates the
9Note that equation 1.30 and equation 1.31 are not deﬁned for ξ = 0.
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socially optimal bargaining outcome if and only if ﬁrms’ bargaining power ξ coincides
with the matching elasticity of vacancies α. With convex labor adjustment costs, however,
social optimality requires that the entire match surplus St accrues to the ﬁrms (i.e. ξ =
1). This implies that the wage bill per worker wtlt is equal to the household’s outside
alternative. Nevertheless, we consider the general case ξ ∈ (0,1] throughout our analysis.
The resulting wage bill per worker equals the weighted average of the gross ﬂow value
of the marginal match and household’s outside alternative:

























Household’s outside alternative depends on the ﬂow value of unemployment, i.e. the
current utility gain in leisure (uU −uN
t )/λt, and the continuation payoﬀ from labor market
search. The latter, in turn, depends on the current job ﬁnding rate mt/(1−nt) times her
adjusted share (1 − ξ)/ξ of the expected present value of a prospective future match κxt.
Consequently, household’s outside alternative is very sensitive to current labor market
conditions.
Notably, the expected present value of the current match (see equation 1.19 and equa-
tion 1.20) does not enter equation (1.30). This is due to the fact that the mutual surplus
is always allocated according to the same sharing rule (1.28). Hence, both expressions
widen the bargaining set proportionally, but have no impact on the bargaining outcome.
We deﬁne the replacement rate b as the ratio between the ﬂow value of unemployment
and the gross ﬂow value of the marginal match.
Strategic Wage Bargaining
Hall and Milgrom (2008) highlight that Nash bargaining abstracts from the dynamic and
interactive character of wage negotiations. For that reason, they argue that wages in
the job matching model should be determined by a Rubinstein (1982) game of alternat-
ing oﬀers. In particular, Hall and Milgrom (2008) emphasize the crucial importance of
the prospective mutual surplus. The mutual surplus gives both players strong incentives
to conclude the bargaining successfully. Hence, neither party seriously considers break-
ing up the bargaining process completely. Given perfect information, this implies that
threatening to terminate the bargaining process is not a credible option (Schelling, 1960).
Instead, both parties threaten each other to reject unfavorable demands. Since both par-
ties are impatient, this strategy causes costly delays and gives them the incentive always to
make acceptable demands. Consequently, once a ﬁrm-worker match has successfully been
formed, it is the value of bargaining – and not the outside alternative – that determines
the relevant surplus.
In their analysis, Hall and Milgrom (2008) focus on the limiting case in which the
time interval between successive oﬀers decreases to zero. Under these circumstances, they
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show that both parties agree on the equilibrium wage bill per worker instantaneously. This
allows us to approximate the solution to the dynamic bargaining game by a corresponding
static game (Binmore et al., 1986). The solution to this new game can be found by
maximizing the weighted product of the two surplus shares – like in the standard Nash
solution. However, the solution to this dynamic bargaining problem is inherently diﬀerent
from the Nash solution as the surplus of each party is no longer determined by the
respective outside alternative, but by the losses associated with delays.
Following Hall and Milgrom (2008), we calibrate the dynamic bargaining model to the
same steady state as the standard bargaining model. This simplifying assumption implies
that the steady state value of bargaining coincides with the outside alternative.10 Further-
more, Hall and Milgrom (2008) emphasize that the value of bargaining might depend less
sensitively on current labor market conditions than the outside alternative. Thus, they
take the value of bargaining to be time-invariant. For this reason, we replace all variables
in equation (1.30) that derive from the outside alternative with their steady state values
(denoted by an over line):




















(1 − ¯ n)
 
. (1.31)
This sharing rule is equivalent to Nash bargaining with a constant outside alternative.
Given that the outside alternative is typically pro-cyclical, the dynamic bargaining game
generates a less elastic wage bill per worker than Nash bargaining. Consequently, the
households’ share of the surplus falls below (1−ξ) in economic upswings (and vice versa).
Note that the wage bill per worker satisﬁes individual rationality as long as it remains
within the bargaining set.
In summary, strategic wage bargaining gives rise to two distortionary eﬀects. As
discussed above, social optimality under convex labor adjustment costs requires that the
wage bill per worker wtlt is equal to the household’s outside alternative. In contrast, we
assume that (i) the wage bill per worker is independent of the ﬂuctuations in household’s
outside alternative and (ii) ﬁrms’ bargaining power ξ is generally smaller than unity, i.e.
ξ ∈ (0,1]. Hence, ﬁrms’ private gains from search eﬀort are generally smaller than their
social contribution. In this case, the dynamic behavior of the wage bill per worker is not
socially optimal (Hosios, 1990).
1.2.6 Optimal Labor Eﬀort
The model is closed with the condition for optimal labor eﬀort lt (“hours”). We assume
that both parties have a joint interest to maximize the value of the mutual surplus St.
10Actually, if the value of bargaining coincided with the outside alternative, the respective player would
be indiﬀerent between delaying and terminating the bargain.
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Provided that the marginal product per “hour” F2,t is taken as given by both parties, the








(1 − lt)η. (1.32)
This condition determines how the wage bill per worker is split up into the real wage rate
per “hour” wt and “hours” per worker lt.
1.2.7 Competitive Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is a set of allocations {ct, kt+1, vt, nt+1} and prices {rt, wt},
such that:
(i) employment relationships are governed by the matching function (1.1) and the law
of motion of employment (1.4)
(ii) {ct,kt+1} solves the household’s problem (1.5) subject to the budget constraint (1.6)
and the law of motion for its employment share (1.7)
(iii) total factor productivity follows the exogenous stochastic process (1.11)
(iv) {kt,vt} solves the ﬁrm’s problem (1.13) subject to the production technology (1.14)
and the law of motion for its stock of employment (1.15)
(v) the resource constraint (1.18) holds and the perfectly competitive capital market
clears
(vi) the wage bill per worker is determined either by Nash bargaining (1.30) or by strate-
gic wage bargaining (1.31)
(vii) hours per worker maximize the mutual surplus (1.32)
(viii) an initial condition for the state space (k0,n0,z0) is given
Consequently, the competitive equilibrium is deﬁned by following conditions: (1.1), (1.4),
(1.8), (1.9), (1.10), (1.11), (1.14), (1.16), (1.17), (1.18), either (1.30) or (1.31), and (1.32).
1.3 Model Evaluation
1.3.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model so that one period corresponds to a month. This seems advan-
tageous given that, in the U.S., the job ﬁnding rate is very high. When we simulate the
model, we time-aggregate the artiﬁcial data to quarterly frequencies in order to make
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them comparable to the U.S. aggregate time series. Table 1.1 summarizes the parameter
values of our model.
Using data on aggregate income shares, Cooley and Prescott (1995) calibrate the pro-
duction elasticities of capital (θ = 0.40) and labor (1 − θ = 0.60). We adopt their
conventional values, even though the production elasticity of labor is slightly larger than
the average labor share in our job matching model (0.58, see table 1.2). In addition, we set
the monthly depreciation rate δ to match an annual rate of 10% (Kydland and Prescott,
1982).
β is chosen to be consistent with a quarterly real interest rate of 1 percent. Following
Juster and Staﬀord (1991), we set the steady state working time of employed household
members to l = 1/3 of their discretionary time endowment. Moreover, Barron and Gilley
(1981) estimate that the typical unemployed primarily engaged in random job search
(approximately one half of the sample) spends between 8 and 9 hours per week to contact
potential employers. This corresponds to about 25% of the average working time l. For
the given speciﬁcation of preferences (Andolfatto, 1996), the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in labor supply is given as: ν = η−1((1/l)−1). Blundell and Macurdy (1999)
provide robust evidence that the value of ν for annual hours of employed men is between
0.1 and 0.3. For employed women, Blundell et al. (1988) and Triest (1990) estimate
values in the same range. However, Browning et al. (1999) observe that leisure is more
substitutable over shorter intervals than longer ones. Using monthly data on employed
men, MaCurdy (1983) ﬁnds signiﬁcantly higher elasticities (0.3 − 0.7). Hence, we choose
ν equal to 0.5, which implies setting η = 4.
We calibrate the monthly job separation rate to 3.5% (Shimer, 2007). This value
implies that the average job duration is 2 1/2 years. Furthermore, the steady state
unemployment rate is set to 10 percent (Hall, 2005b). This measure includes the of-
ﬁcially unemployed job searchers and the pool of marginally attached non-participants
(Jones and Riddell, 1999). Thus, our calibration implies that the average job ﬁnding
rate, q(γ)γ, is equal to 0.32 (see table 1.2), which is consistent with the results of
Hall (2005b). The monthly vacancy ﬁlling rate is set to match the quarterly value
q(γ) = 0.71 estimated by van Ours and Ridder (1992).11 Based on the fact that per-
period labor adjustment costs “are not much more than one percent of per-period payroll
cost” (Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996, p. 1278), we calibrate aggregate labor adjustment
costs ψ equal to 1% of aggregate output. This value implies that the average replacement
ratio b is equal to 63%. This value is somewhat larger than the upper bound (b = 40%)
estimated by Shimer (2005). However, Shimer (2005) interprets b entirely as an unem-
ployment beneﬁt. In our model b includes also utility costs of working, e.g. leisure value
of unemployment or the value of home production (Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008). Un-
11According to (Shimer, 2005), the model allows the normalization of the vacancy ﬁlling rate. Never-
theless, we choose a meaningful value.
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fortunately, empirical evidence on the size of the leisure value of unemployment is scarce
(Holmlund, 1998). According to Costain and Reiter (2008), the upper bound of the utility
costs of working is equal to 75%. Hence, our value seems reasonable.12
We calibrate the matching elasticity of unemployment to α = 0.5. This value is
within the plausible range (0.5 − 0.7) proposed by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). In
addition, we assume symmetrically distributed bargaining power, i.e. ξ = 0.5 (Svejnar,
1986). Thus, as mentioned above, our model gives rise to two distortionary eﬀects. On
the one hand, we assume that the wage bill per worker is independent of the ﬂuctuations
in the household’s outside alternative. On the other hand, ﬁrms’ bargaining power ξ
is strictly smaller than unity.13 Consequently, their private gains from search eﬀort are
generally smaller than their social contribution (Hosios, 1990). Nevertheless, we set α = ξ
in order to facilitate comparison with the existing literature.
We calibrate the law of motion for the technology shock by setting the monthly
autocorrelation coeﬃcient ρ equal to 0.9830 and the standard deviation σǫ equal to
0.0044. The monthly autocorrelation coeﬃcient is chosen to match the conventionally
used quarterly value of 0.95 (Cooley and Prescott, 1995). Furthermore, we set the stan-
dard deviation of the monthly process so that the volatility of the time-aggregated Solow
residual is in accordance with a standard-calibrated quarterly real business cycle model
(Cooley and Prescott, 1995).14
Notice that our calibration ensures that the reservation value of the ﬁrm (wl)max is
larger than the reservation value of the household (wl)min.
1.3.2 Results
This section examines the quantitative performance of the modiﬁed job matching model.
We analyze how the chosen wage determination mechanism and the costs of labor adjust-
ment, respectively, aﬀect the dynamics of the model in response to technology shocks.
Moreover, we highlight the interactions between both modiﬁcations.
We evaluate the model generated time series against quarterly U.S. data from 1964:1 to
1999:4. Most of the time series are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FREDr).
In addition, we use the expanded unemployment series from Hall (2005b). From this data
we construct a set of time series which corresponds to the variables in our model (see
table 1.3 and table 1.4). We log and detrend all series using the Hodrick and Prescott
12In the model with linear vacancy posting costs, ψ = 0.01 implies that the average replacement
ratio is equal to 81%. This value is slightly larger than the upper bound (b = 75%) suggested by
Costain and Reiter (2008), but still below the estimate b = 94% of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). The
choice for b is crucial, because a larger b decreases the surplus. Consequently, the higher the value of b,
the easier it is to leverage a given shock into labor market ﬂuctuations.
13The social planner’s problem is documented in Appendix 1.A.2.
14Cooley and Prescott (1995) estimate the quarterly parameters (ρ = 0.95,σǫ = 0.007) assuming that
the labor income share equals 1 − θ. In labor search models, this assumption holds only as an approxi-
mation.
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(1997) ﬁlter assuming a smoothing parameter of 1600.
Table 1.5 reports the well-known business cycle statistics of the U.S. labor market.
In particular, we focus on the cyclical behavior of vacancies v and unemployment 1 − n.
The data reveal that both variables are highly volatile and very persistent. In addi-
tion, vacancies are clearly pro-cyclical whereas unemployment is strongly counter-cyclical.
Consequently, vacancies and unemployment are almost perfectly negatively correlated
(ρV U = −0.95). Due to the strong persistence of both variables, we observe that the
negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment remains also at leads and lags
(Fujita, 2004). Hence, the dynamic correlation structure between vacancies and unem-
ployment follows a pronounced U-shape (see table 1.6 and ﬁgure 1.3). This pattern is
known as the “dynamic Beveridge curve”.15 Furthermore, we observe that the wage bill
per worker wl is signiﬁcantly less volatile and less pro-cyclical than output per worker
y/n.
We log-linearize the model around the non-stochastic steady state and solve for the
recursive law of motion using the “Toolkit” from Uhlig (1998).16 Corresponding to the U.S.
data sample period, we simulate the model to 432 “monthly” data points. Subsequently,
we transform the artiﬁcial data as described above and compute the statistics over 10.000
simulations.
Comparative Impulse Response Analysis
We now inspect the model’s impulse responses to a one percent shock in total factor pro-
ductivity. In particular, we explore the role of the chosen wage determination mechanism
and the costs of labor adjustment, as well as the interactions between them. Figure 1.1
compares the impulse responses of the strategic bargaining model with convex labor ad-
justment costs (henceforth called the “benchmark model”, denoted by a solid line), the
Nash bargaining model with convex labor adjustment costs (henceforth called the “NB
model”, denoted by a dashed line), and the and the strategic wage bargaining model with
linear vacancy posting costs (henceforth called the “LC model”, denoted by a dotted line).
The graphs depict the evolution of the relevant variables over 96 months (32 quarters).
The Benchmark Model The hiring condition (1.17) reveals that the pattern of cyclical
employment adjustment is governed by two main determinants: First, the net ﬂow value of
the marginal match captures cyclical variations in the return to additional employment.
Second, the structure of labor adjustment costs determines how fast and at what cost
ﬁrms adjust employment over the business cycle. In the following, we focus on the impact
of these two factors.
15See, inter alia, Fujita and Ramey (2006) and the references therein.
16The above calibration ensures a unique and stable equilibrium.
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In response to a one percent technology shock, we observe that the gross ﬂow value of
the marginal match rises by about one percent. The elasticity of the wage bill per worker,
in contrast, is signiﬁcantly lower. This follows directly from strategic wage bargaining
(see equation 1.31). Accordingly, the elasticity of the wage bill per worker is given by the
elasticity of the gross ﬂow value of the marginal match times the household’s bargaining
power (1 − ξ). As a result, the costs per worker increase much less than the gains. This
generates an increase of about 17 percent in the net ﬂow value of the marginal match,
giving ﬁrms strong incentives to amplify employment adjustment over the business cycle.
In the case of convex labor adjustment costs, ﬁrms choose the optimal number of
vacancies vt such that expected marginal matching costs κxt are equal to the expected
present value of the marginal match. Due to the convex shape of ψt, new job matches
mt are much less elastic than the net ﬂow value of the marginal match. Furthermore, the
convex shape of ψt gives ﬁrms strong incentives to smooth hiring activities over several
periods. For this reason, new job matches rise on impact by somewhat more than 4
percent and then remain well above their steady state value for the entire observation
period. This continuous inﬂow of new job matches leads to a pronounced hump-shape in
the impulse response function of employment, which peaks about 2 1/2 years after the
shock. Consequently, the impulse response function of unemployment follows a distinct
U-shape.
Moreover, the strong reaction in employment feeds back to the expected marginal
matching costs. Given that employment is a state variable, the impulse response function
of expected marginal hiring costs increases on impact by exactly the same amount as new
job matches. In the following periods, however, the long-lasting increase in employment
dampens marginal hiring costs. Hence, the impulse response function of marginal hiring
costs converges relatively quickly to its steady state value. This pattern reinforces gradual
and long-lasting hiring activities and, thus, might explain the remarkable slow convergence
of new job matches.
Finally, we analyze the impulse response function of vacancies. As mentioned above,
we assume that ﬁrms’ hiring costs depend on the number of vacancies that are ﬁlled,
and not on the number of vacancies that are posted. Therefore, ﬁrms always post the
number of vacancies that is necessary to obtain the optimal number of new job matches.
According to the aggregate matching function (see equation 1.1), the number of new job
matches is given by the current level of unemployment and the number of vacancies that
are posted. In response to a positive technology shock, ﬁrms face following scenario: On
the one hand, ﬁrms have to maintain a continuous inﬂow of new job matches. On the other
hand, the impulse response function of unemployment decreases sharply over more than
2 1/2 years. This leads to a strong fall in the vacancy ﬁlling rate. The lower the vacancy
ﬁlling rate, the more vacancies have to be posted in order to obtain the optimal number
of new matches. For this reason, the impulse response function of vacancies increases on
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impact by about 10 percent. In the following periods, vacancies continue to rise and reach
a maximum of 18 percent increase with 2 1/2 years delay. In words, the impulse response
of vacancies follows a marked hump-shape. This pattern is found to be consistent with
the data.17
The Impact of Strategic Wage Bargaining We now discuss the impulse responses
of the “NB model”. Under Nash bargaining, the elasticity of the wage bill per worker is not
only determined by the gross ﬂow value of the marginal match, but also by the household’s
outside alternative. Given that household’s outside alternative is clearly pro-cyclical, we
note that the elasticity of the wage bill per worker increases substantially. Hence, the
wage bill per worker is nearly as elastic as the gross ﬂow value of the marginal match. As
a result, the costs per worker increase almost as much as the gains. This implies that the
elasticity of the net ﬂow value of the marginal match decreases enormously. Additionally,
due to the hump-shape in the household’s outside alternative, the net ﬂow value of the
marginal match is less persistent than in the benchmark model. This illustrates that
Nash bargaining gives ﬁrms much less incentives to hire new workers than strategic wage
bargaining.
In fact, we observe that ﬁrms’ hiring activities decline dramatically. On impact, new
job matches rise only by less than one percent and then fall back quickly to their steady
state value. Thus, the impulse response of employment is substantially smaller. For the
same reason, the U-shaped response of unemployment is much weaker. Moreover, due to
the mild response of employment, the feedback eﬀect from employment on lower expected
marginal matching costs is almost not present.
The modest increase in matches, in conjunction with the weak reduction in unemploy-
ment, implies that the vacancy ﬁlling rate reduces only slightly. Consequently, vacancies
rise on impact only by somewhat more than one percent, continue to increase slightly for
about 3 quarters, and then return slow and monotone to their steady state value. For
this reason, vacancies are much less elastic than in the benchmark model. Furthermore,
we observe that the hump-shaped dynamics of the impulse response functions are less
distinct.
We conclude that strategic wage bargaining ampliﬁes the elasticity of employment,
unemployment and vacancies enormously. Apart from that, the hump-shaped (U-shaped)
response of vacancies (unemployment) is more distinct under Nash bargaining.
The Impact of Convex Labor Adjustment Costs We now examine the impact of
convex labor adjustment costs on the dynamic behavior of the labor market. Therefore,
we compare the impulse responses of the benchmark model with the impulse responses of
the “LC model”. In both cases under consideration, the wage bill per worker is determined
17See Footnote 2 and the references therein.
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by strategic wage bargaining. We observe that the instantaneous elasticities of the gross
ﬂow value of the marginal match, household’s outside alternative, and the wage bill per
worker, respectively, are very similar. In contrast, the relative response of the net ﬂow
value of the marginal match in the LC model is signiﬁcantly larger than in the benchmark
model.18 Consequently, one should expect that the LC model generates larger employment
ﬂuctuations.
On impact, the elasticity of new job matches in the LC model is about three times
larger than in the benchmark model. In the following periods, however, ﬁrms’ hiring
activities decrease sharply. As a result, the impulse response function of employment
peaks already after about 9 months. This is due to the modiﬁed hiring mechanism. Given
linear vacancy posting costs, ﬁrms post vacancies in order to equalize expected marginal
hiring costs κ/q(γt) and the expected present value of the marginal match.19 In contrast
to the benchmark model, expected marginal hiring costs in the LC model depend on the
inverse vacancy ﬁlling rate 1/q(γt) and not on the gross hiring rate xt. In response to the
technology shock, the inverse vacancy ﬁlling rate increases by about 13 percent and then
remains persistently well above its steady state value over the whole observation period.
This behavior diﬀers substantially from the rather moderate and temporary increase of
the gross hiring rate in the benchmark model.
Since ﬁrms are forward looking, they anticipate the future fall in unemployment when
deciding upon the optimal number of vacancies. The future fall in unemployment tightens
the labor market and, thus, raises the expected marginal matching costs in the future.
For this reason, ﬁrms post vacancies instantaneously as long as the number of unemployed
job searchers is still high. This pattern makes it impossible for the LC model to generate a
hump-shaped impulse response function of vacancies. Instead, vacancies spike on impact
and fall back half way only one period later. This behavior is in sharp contrast to the
empirical evidence.
In the benchmark model, however, the mechanism works into the other direction.
Firms’ expected marginal hiring costs depend on the gross hiring rate xt. This implies
that a high level of employment (i.e. a low level of unemployment) lowers expected
marginal costs. In comparison to the inverse vacancy ﬁlling rate, the gross hiring rate
is much less elastic and much less persistent. This removes ﬁrms’ incentive to adjust
employment instantaneously. On the contrary, it gives ﬁrms strong incentives to smooth
hiring over a long period. Hence, the overall employment impact in the LC model is
substantially lower than in the benchmark model.
The Interactions between Strategic Wage Bargaining and Convex Labor Ad-
justment Costs So far, we have found that (i) strategic wage bargaining ampliﬁes labor
18Note that the absolute value of the net ﬂow value of the marginal match in the benchmark model is
about twice as large than in the LC model (see footnote 12).
19See Appendix 1.A.1 for the ﬁrm’s problem in the LC model.
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market ﬂuctuations and (ii) convex labor adjustment costs account for hump-shaped im-
pulse response functions. Indeed, beyond understanding how both modiﬁcations work in
isolation, it is important to explore their interactions.
As discussed above, the impact of current labor market conditions on expected margi-
nal matching costs depends crucially on the speciﬁcation of ﬁrms’ hiring costs. In the LC
model, a tight labor market raises expected marginal matching costs. In the benchmark
model, in contrast, a high level of employment lowers expected marginal matching costs.
Consequently, strategic wage bargaining ampliﬁes the elasticity of labor market variables
through two channels. On the one hand, strategic wage bargaining dampens the cyclical
ﬂuctuations in the wage bill per worker. This stimulates ﬁrms’ hiring activities. On the
other hand, the higher the stock of employment, the lower the costs of labor adjustment.
Thus, the introduction of convex labor adjustment costs increases not only labor market
persistence, but also its cyclical ﬂuctuations.
Furthermore, we observe that labor market variables in the benchmark model are
even somewhat more persistent than in the NB model. This is due to the fact that
strategic wage bargaining removes the impact of the hump-shaped outside alternative.
Hence, the net ﬂow value of the marginal match is more persistent, translating into more
persistent labor market ﬂuctuations. In summary, we note that strategic wage bargaining
and convex labor adjustment costs are complementary in generating elastic and persistent
labor market responses.
Robustness of the Hump-Shaped Vacancy Responses In the following, we exam-
ine whether the hump-shaped impulse response function of vacancies in the benchmark
model is robust with respect to the two distortionary eﬀects – strategic wage bargaining
and the value of ﬁrms’ bargaining power.
As shown in a previous paragraph, vacancies in the NB model are much less elastic
than in the benchmark model. In addition, the hump-shape is ﬂattened considerably.
Therefore, we evaluate the benchmark model with ﬁrms’ bargaining power set to unity.
On impact, vacancies rise by about 15 percent. This increase is about one and a half
times higher than in the case of symmetrically distributed bargaining power. Moreover,
vacancies display a marked hump-shape, albeit the hump is slightly weaker than in the
benchmark model.
However, social optimality under convex labor adjustment costs requires that the wage
bill per worker equals household’s outside alternative. This condition is only satisﬁed if
we assume Nash bargaining and if we set ﬁrms’ bargaining power equal to unity. We now
observe that vacancies increase on impact by about 7 percent, reach a maximum with
about 3 quarters delay, and then return relatively quickly to their steady state value.
These results indicate that the combination of both distortionary eﬀects dampens the
hump to some degree. Nevertheless, the hump-shaped pattern of vacancies is a robust
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result of our benchmark model.
Simulation Results
This section evaluates the benchmark model against U.S. data. Thereby, our analysis
focuses on the cyclical behavior of vacancies and unemployment (table 1.5). In particu-
lar, we examine the model in terms of its capability to generate suﬃcient volatility and
persistence in both variables.
The Benchmark Model Strategic wage bargaining makes the wage bill per worker
independent of ﬂuctuations in household’s outside alternative. Hence, the wage bill per
worker (wl) is signiﬁcantly less volatile than output per worker (y/n), giving ﬁrms strong
incentives to expand their hiring activities in economic upswings. Thus, the benchmark
model replicates closely the cyclical volatility of vacancies (v), unemployment (1−n) and
market tightness (γ). This result is in line with the insight in Hall and Milgrom (2008):
Strategic wage bargaining generates endogenous real wage rigidity. This increases the
volatility of the net ﬂow value of the marginal match. As a result, labor market variables
become more volatile.
Furthermore, we note that vacancies, unemployment and market tightness are highly
persistent. This can be ascribed to the modiﬁed hiring condition which alters the qual-
itative pattern of ﬁrms’ hiring behavior. Consequently, the benchmark model generates
hump-shaped responses in unemployment and vacancies. For the same reason, the bench-
mark model is capable to replicate the U-shaped pattern of the dynamic Beveridge curve
(see table 1.6 and ﬁgure 1.3). Consistent with the data, the negative relation between
model generated vacancies and unemployment remains for more than 4 quarters.
Apart from that, the benchmark model accounts for the fact that unemployment and
market tightness lag the cycle by one quarter. This indicates that the combination of
strategic wage bargaining and convex labor adjustment costs enhances the model’s ability
to propagate technology shocks in the labor market. On the other hand, the benchmark
model cannot match the cyclical co-movement of two other variables – output per worker
and the wage bill per worker. In the data, the contemporaneous correlation between
output and output per worker is close to unity. The wage bill per worker, in contrast,
shows a much weaker contemporaneous correlation with output. Table 1.7 displays that
both variables are only moderately positively correlated. In the model, however, we
observe that output per worker and the wage bill per worker are perfectly correlated.
Indeed, the almost perfect correlation between output per worker and the wage bill
per worker is generated essentially by construction. Equation (1.31) shows that variations
in the wage bill per worker are closely related to changes in output per worker. Since this
paper is motivated by the cyclical behavior of vacancies and unemployment, we allow only
for total factor productivity shocks. Yet, we conjecture that adding a shock to the value
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of bargaining may help to bring the co-movement of labor market variables closer to the
data.
The Impact of Strategic Wage Bargaining In the NB model, both parties receive
period-by-period a constant share of the mutual surplus. For this reason, the wage bill
per worker is almost as volatile as output per worker, giving ﬁrms little incentive to adjust
employment over the business cycle. This contrasts sharply with the data. Consequently,
the cyclical ﬂuctuations of vacancies and unemployment are insuﬃciently small. The same
applies to market tightness, conﬁrming the conclusion reached by Shimer (2005).
On the other hand, the Nash bargaining assumption does not alter the qualitative
pattern of employment adjustment. The model generated time series of vacancies and
unemployment remain almost as persistent as in the benchmark model. As a result, the
dynamic Beveridge curve maintains the U-shaped pattern. Even though, we note that the
negative relation between vacancies and unemployment remains now only for somewhat
more than 3 quarters (instead of more than 4 quarters in the benchmark model). This
might be due to the fact that Nash bargaining reduces not only the volatility, but also
the persistence of the net ﬂow value of the marginal match.
The Impact of Convex Labor Adjustment Costs Due to strategic wage bargaining,
we observe that the wage bill per worker is about half as volatile as output per worker,
giving ﬁrms strong incentives to amplify hiring activities. This result holds independently
of the hiring cost function. In the LC model, however, we observe that vacancies spike
on impact and fall back very quickly. Consequently, the cumulative inﬂow of new job
matches in the LC model is much weaker than in the benchmark model, inducing less
volatility in employment, unemployment and market tightness.
For the same reason, all labor market variables are much less persistent. This pattern
can be ascribed to the modiﬁed hiring condition. Given linear vacancy posting costs,
ﬁrms anticipate the fall in the vacancy ﬁlling ratio and, hence, adjust employment instan-
taneously. On the contrary, convex labor adjustment costs give ﬁrms strong incentives
to smooth their hiring activities over several periods. This causes the continuous inﬂow
of new job matches in the benchmark model, generating highly persistent labor market
variables. Thus, as pointed out by Yashiv (2006), convex labor adjustment costs improve
the performance of the job search and matching model considerably.
In particular, the ﬁrst order autocorrelation of vacancies in the LC model is much
weaker than in the benchmark model. This follows directly from the counter-factual shape
of the impulse response function under linear vacancy posting costs. Moreover, the shape
of the dynamic Beveridge curve is biased. Despite the strong negative contemporaneous
correlation, the cross-correlation between unemployment and leaded vacancies is close
to zero beyond 2 quarters. In other words, the LC model predicts rather a J-shaped
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relationship, echoing the ﬁndings of Fujita (2004).
The Interactions between Strategic Wage Bargaining and Convex Labor Ad-
justment Costs We summarize that (i) strategic wage bargaining ampliﬁes the volatil-
ity of the labor market and (ii) convex labor adjustment costs improve labor market
persistence. Therefore, we conclude that only the combination of both features generates
suﬃcient volatility and persistence in the labor market.
Furthermore, the results presented above indicate that strategic wage bargaining and
convex labor adjustment costs are complementary in generating volatility and persistence.
This interesting result stems from the speciﬁcation of the hiring cost function. Following
Gertler and Trigari (2009), ﬁrms’ hiring costs now depend negatively on the employment
level. Hence, large labor market ﬂuctuations dampen the cyclical variations of ﬁrm’s hiring
costs. For this reason, strategic wage bargaining ampliﬁes the volatility of labor market
variables through two channels. On the one hand, strategic wage bargaining ampliﬁes
ﬁrms’ hiring activities in economic upswings. On the other hand, the higher the stock
of employment, the lower the costs of labor adjustment. Consequently, the introduction
of convex labor adjustment costs enhances the cyclical volatility of unemployment and
market tightness. The volatility of vacancies, however, remains virtually unchanged.
In addition, strategic wage bargaining removes the impact of the hump-shaped outside
alternative on the wage bill per worker. Thus, strategic wage bargaining induces not only
more labor market volatility, but also more labor market persistence.
The complementarity between strategic wage bargaining and convex labor adjustment
costs is also illustrated by the dynamic Beveridge curve. Only if we combine both features,
the negative relation between vacancies and unemployment remains for more than 4 quar-
ters. Clearly, the impact of convex labor adjustment costs seems to be more important
in this respect.
Business Cycle Analysis The last section has shown that the benchmark model repli-
cates the cyclical behavior of the labor market remarkably well. In the following, we an-
alyze the business cycle properties of the benchmark model more comprehensively. The
main features of the US business cycle are well-known (Cooley and Prescott, 1995): The
ﬂuctuations of output y and total hours nl are nearly equal, while consumption c ﬂuc-
tuates less and investment i ﬂuctuates more. Employment n is almost as volatile as
output, indicating that ﬂuctuations in total hours are generated for the most part by
the extensive margin. This conjecture is conﬁrmed by the relatively tiny ﬂuctuations in
hours per worker l. In addition, also labor productivity y/(nl) and the real wage rate
w ﬂuctuate considerably less than output. All these variables are pro-cyclical, albeit la-
bor productivity and real wages show clearly less pro-cyclical variations than the other
variables.
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Table 1.8 compares the business cycle statistics of the benchmark model with the data.
In total, the benchmark model captures properly the cyclical behavior of consumption,
investment and employment. In particular, the benchmark model works well along the
extensive margin of cyclical employment adjustment. Beyond matching the standard
business cycle facts, the benchmark model accounts additionally for the low and positive
correlation between employment and the wage bill per worker found in U.S. data (see
table 1.9).
Furthermore, the data reveal that the empirical correlation between total hours and
the real wage rate is essentially zero. This pattern is often referred to as the “Dunlop-
Tarshis observation”.20 However, we observe that the benchmark model cannot match
this stylized fact as closely as the other features of the U.S. business cycle. Nevertheless,
the benchmark model performs much better than the alternative model speciﬁcations.
The failure to match the Dunlop-Tarshis observation indicates that the model cannot
replicate the cyclical co-movement of hours per worker.21 In the data, hours per worker
are pro-cyclical. In the model, the contemporaneous correlation between output and
hours per worker is close to zero. This artifact follows from the interactions between
strategic wage bargaining and convex labor adjustment costs. As described above, the
combination of both modiﬁcations induces larger employment ﬂuctuations than the other
model speciﬁcations. This leads to larger output ﬂuctuations, implying a strong income
eﬀect. On the other hand, the combination of strategic wage bargaining and convex
labor adjustment leads to a fast decline in labor productivity. This implies that the
intertemporal substitution eﬀect is relatively weak. Consequently, workers grant more
value to leisure and, thus, make less (additional) labor eﬀort in economic upswings.
Apart from that, the counter-factual behavior of hours per worker biases also the
cyclical properties of some other variables, like the real wage rate. Given that the real
wage rate is deﬁned as the wage bill per worker over hours per worker, the real wage rate
has to account for almost the whole pro-cyclicality of the individual wage bill. As a result,
the model generated real wage rate is highly pro-cyclical – in stark contrast to the data.
Furthermore, labor productivity is too pro-cyclical and total hours are too less volatile.
For the same reason, we observe that the benchmark model cannot fully account for
the relatively high volatility of the aggregate wage bill. In addition, the aggregate wage
bill is too pro-cyclical. Hence, the benchmark model generates too much volatility in the
labor share and underestimates its lead. Yet, the benchmark model still improves the
dynamic behavior of the labor share slightly compared to previous studies (Andolfatto,
1996).
Moreover, we note that output volatility is slightly lower than in the data. This
20See, inter alia, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and the references therein.
21Note that we observe hours per worker in the data. In the model, however, lt might capture rather
(unobservable) labor eﬀort.
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may be due to the somewhat understated volatility in total hours and investment. How-
ever, it is likely to increase output volatility by allowing for variable capital utilization
(Burnside and Eichenbaum, 1996).
Finally, we analyze the cyclical behavior of the wage bill per worker, relative to the
cyclical behavior of the bargaining set. As explained above, the wage bill per worker
satisﬁes individual rationality only if it lies in the bargaining set. For this purpose, ﬁgure
1.4 reports the evolution of the reservation value of the ﬁrm (upper graph), the wage bill
per worker (middle graph) and the reservation value of the household (lower graph) over
12000 simulated periods. We highlight the steady state value of household’s reservation
value as well as its 95% conﬁdence interval. The graphs show that the wage bill per worker
is always in the bargaining set during any period in this long simulation. Moreover, the
upper conﬁdence bound of household’s reservation value is far below the graph of the wage
bill per worker. Consequently, all employment formations are eﬃcient (Hall, 2005a). In
other words, the critique of Barro (1977) does not apply here.
1.4 Conclusion
This paper modiﬁes the standard Mortensen-Pissarides job matching model in order to
explain the cyclical behavior of vacancies and unemployment. The modiﬁcations include
convex labor adjustment costs and strategic wage bargaining as introduced into the liter-
ature by Hall and Milgrom (2008). The main contribution of our paper is to improve the
cyclical behavior of vacancies and unemployment along two dimensions – volatility and
persistence.
First, we show that strategic wage bargaining increases the volatility of both variables
enormously. This is due to the fact that strategic wage bargaining makes the wage bill per
worker independent of the ﬂuctuations in household’s outside alternative. As a result, the
elasticity of ﬁrms’ costs per worker is reduced by half. Hence, ﬁrms have much stronger
incentives to hire new workers in economic upswings.
Second, the introduction of convex labor adjustment costs leads to more persistent
labor market responses. In particular, the impulse response function of vacancies shows
a marked hump-shape, peaking with several quarters delay. This can be attributed to
the ﬁrms’ altered optimization problem. In contrast to the case of linear vacancy posting
costs, ﬁrms’ hiring costs now depend on the number of vacancies that are ﬁlled, and not on
the number of vacancies that are posted. Thus, marginal hiring costs under convex labor
adjustment costs are less volatile and less persistent than under linear vacancy posting
costs, giving ﬁrms strong incentives to smooth their hiring activities.
Moreover, we observe that strategic wage bargaining and convex labor adjustment
costs are complementary in generating labor market volatility and persistence. This
interesting result stems from the speciﬁcation of the hiring cost function. Following
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Gertler and Trigari (2009), we assume that ﬁrms’ hiring costs depend negatively on the
employment level. For this reason, strategic wage bargaining ampliﬁes the elasticity of
labor market variables through two channels. On the one hand, strategic wage bargain-
ing enhances employment volatility. On the other hand, large labor market ﬂuctuations
dampen the cyclical variations of ﬁrms’ hiring costs. Consequently, the introduction of
convex labor adjustment costs induces not only more persistence, but also more volatility
in the labor market.
Apart from that, we ﬁnd that our model gives rise to two distortionary eﬀects. Given
convex labor adjustment costs, social optimality requires that the wage bill per worker is
equal to the household’s outside alternative. In contrast, we assume that (i) the wage bill
per worker is independent of the ﬂuctuations in household’s outside alternative and (ii)
ﬁrms’ bargaining power ξ is strictly smaller than unity. Therefore, ﬁrms’ private gains
from search eﬀort are generally smaller than their social contribution. In this case, the
dynamic behavior of the wage bill per worker is not socially optimal (Hosios, 1990).
It would be interesting to extent our analysis toward endogenizing the value of bar-
gaining. To our knowledge, the only paper that attempts to address this issue is by Knabe
(2005). The study of such questions, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Appendix 1.A Computations
1.A.1 Firm’s Problem with Linear Vacancy Posting Costs




t ) = max
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nt+1 = (1 − σ)nt + q(γt)vt. (1.35)
Corresponding equations (1.16) - (1.17), the ﬁrst order conditions are given as:




















Corresponding equation (1.18), the resource constraint of the economy is:
yt = ct + kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt + κvt. (1.38)
Corresponding equation (1.30) the wage bill per worker under Nash bargaining is:




















Corresponding equation (1.31) the wage bill per worker under strategic wage bargaining
is:
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Hence, we replace condition (1.17) by (1.37), condition (1.18) by (1.38), condition (1.30)
by (1.39), and condition (1.31) by (1.40) in order to obtain to competitive equilibrium.
1.A.2 Social Planner Solution



















tnt − ct, (1.42)
nt+1 = (1 − σ)nt + mt. (1.43)
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The ﬁrst order conditions are given as:
ct : λt = 1/ct, (1.44)
lt : λtF2(kt,ntlt) = φ1(1 − lt)
−η, (1.45)
kt+1 : λt = βEt [U1(Ωt+1)], (1.46)
nt+1 :  t = βEt [U2(Ωt+1)], (1.47)
vt :  t = λtκxt. (1.48)
The envelope conditions are given as:
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Consequently, the social planner solution is deﬁned by following conditions:
λt = βEtλt+1[F1(kt+1,nt+1lt+1) + 1 − δ], (1.51)
λtF2(kt,ntlt) = φ1(1 − lt)
−η, (1.52)
 t = λtκxt, (1.53)









λt+1F2(kt+1,nt+1lt+1)lt+1 +  t+1
 












nt+1 = (1 − σ)nt + mt. (1.56)
1.A.3 The Market Solution is generally not Socially Optimal
The surplus St (in utility units) equals the social beneﬁt the marginal match:
λtSt = U2(Ωt). (1.57)
We substitute this result into the ﬁrst order condition (1.47):
 t = βEt[λt+1St+1]. (1.58)
The Nash sharing rule (1.28) implies that the ﬁrm gains the share ξ of the surplus:
V1(Ω
F
t ) = ξSt. (1.59)
Hence:
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Substituting (1.60) into (1.61) yields:









κxtλt =  tξ (1.63)
Instead, the ﬁrst order condition of the social planner (1.48) postulates:
λtκxt =  t. (1.64)
Hence, the market solution is socially optimal, if and only if ξ = 1 holds.
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Appendix 1.B Tables
Table 1.1: The Monthly Parameterization of the Model
Description Variable Value Source
Technology
production elasticity of capital θ 0.40 Cooley and Prescott (1995)
depreciation rate δ 0.0083 Kydland and Prescott (1982)
Preferences
discount factor β 0.9967 Kydland and Prescott (1982)
working time per worker l 1/3 Juster and Staﬀord (1991)
eﬀort per job seeker e 1/12 Barron and Gilley (1981)
individual labor ν 0.5 MaCurdy (1983) supply elasticity
Labor Market
job destruction rate σ 0.035 Shimer (2007)
unemployment rate 1 − n 0.10 Hall (2005b)
vacancy ﬁlling rate q(γ) 0.3381 van Ours and Ridder (1992)
adjustment costs/ output ratio ψ 0.01 Hamermesh and Pfann (1996)
matching elasticity of vacancies α 0.5 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
ﬁrm’s bargaining power ξ 0.5 Svejnar (1986)
Technology Shock
1st order autocorrelation ρ 0.9830 Cooley and Prescott (1995)
standard deviation σǫ 0.004395 Cooley and Prescott (1995)
Table 1.2: Implied Steady State Values
Description Variable Value Description Variable Value
job ﬁnding rate q(γ)γ 0.3150 vacancies v 0.0932
matches m 0.0315 gross hiring rate x 0.0350
hiring costs parameter κ 18.1406 matching function parameter χ 1.1305
real interest rate r 0.0034 capital k 34.2200
investment δk 0.2852 consumption c 0.7048
aggregate wage bill/labor share nwl 0.5881 wage bill per worker wl 0.6534
production function parameter ζ 0.5012 real wage w 1.9603
household’s reservation value (wl)min 0.0164 ﬁrm’s reservation value (wl)max 1.2905
leisure parameter employed φ1 0.5605 leisure parameter unemployed φ2 0.0504
leisure exponent η 4 replacement ratio b 0.6331
Table 1.3: Raw Data Series
Key Raw Series Frequency Database Series ID
[1] Labor Force monthly St. Louis Fed: FREDr CLF16OV
[2] Unemployment monthly http://www.stanford.edu/ JF rate calcs
∼rehall/MA-7-13-05.xls (G195:G626)
[3] Vacancies monthly St. Louis Fed: FREDr HELPWANT
[4] Hours per Worker monthly St. Louis Fed: FREDr AWHNONAG
[5] Total Hours monthly St. Louis Fed: FREDr AWHI
[6] Real Wage quarterly St. Louis Fed: FREDr COMPRNFB
[7] Durable Goods quarterly St. Louis Fed: FREDr PCDGCC96
[8] Nondurable Goods quarterly St. Louis Fed: FREDr PCNDGC96
[9] Services quarterly St. Louis Fed: FREDr PCESVC96
[10] Investment quarterly St. Louis Fed: FREDr GPDIC96
Table 1.4: Constructed Data Series
Key Constructed Series Variable Construction
(1) Consumption c = ([8] + [9])/[1]
(2) Investment i = ([7] + [10])/[1]
(3) Output y = (1) + (2)
(4) Employment n = ([1] − [2])/[1]
(5) Unemployment 1 − n = [2]/[1]
(6) Vacancies v = [3]/[1]
(7) Market Tightness v/(1 − n) = (6)/(5)
(8) Hours per Worker l = [4]
(9) Total Hours n · l = [5]
(10) Real Wage w = [6]
(11) Aggregate Wage Bill w · n · l = (9) · (10)
(12) Labor’s Share (w · n · l)/y = (11)/(3)
(13) Labor Productivity y/(n · l) = (3)/(9)
(14) Output per Worker y/n = (3)/(4)
(15) Individual Wage Bill w · l = (10) · (8)
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Table 1.5: Simulation Results. This table shows the results of the model simulations. For each variable,
we report the relative standard deviation (σX/σY ), the ﬁrst order autocorrelation (ρXT,XT+1), the phase
shift relative to output (in parenthesis), and the contemporaneous correlation with output (ρXY ).
v 1 − n γ y/n wl
U.S. Business Cycle Facts
σX/σY 7.36 6.29 13.49 0.83 0.60
ρXT ,XT+1 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.85 0.86
ρXY (+1) 0.85 (+1) -0.79 (+1) 0.83 (0) 0.98 (0) 0.55
Strategic Wage Bargaining with Convex Labor Adjustment Costs
σX/σY 9.84 7.08 16.24 0.63 0.37
ρXT ,XT+1 0.87 0.93 0.91 0.68 0.68
ρXY (0) 0.99 (+1) -0.90 (+1) 0.94 (-1) 0.62 (-1) 0.62
Nash Bargaining with Convex Labor Adjustment Costs
σX/σY 1.42 1.00 2.30 0.92 0.88
ρXT ,XT+1 0.83 0.91 0.89 0.76 0.77
ρXY (0) 0.99 (+1) -0.88 (0) 0.93 (0) 1.00 (0) 1.00
Strategic Wage Bargaining with Linear Vacancy Posting Costs
σX/σY 10.01 6.19 14.82 0.42 0.22
ρXT ,XT+1 0.60 0.83 0.76 0.57 0.57
ρXY (0) 0.88 (0) -0.99 (0) 0.98 (-1) 0.85 (-1) 0.85
Table 1.6: The Dynamic Beveridge Curve. The table shows the correlation coeﬃcients between unem-
ployment ut and vacancies vt+k, lagged respectively leaded by k quarters.
U.S. Data -0.13 -0.34 -0.56 -0.75 -0.90 -0.95 -0.86 -0.67 -0.45 -0.20 0.03
Benchmark Model -0.30 -0.50 -0.69 -0.86 -0.96 -0.94 -0.76 -0.54 -0.32 -0.13 0.04
NB Model -0.22 -0.41 -0.62 -0.82 -0.95 -0.93 -0.71 -0.46 -0.23 -0.04 0.11
LC Model -0.07 -0.22 -0.40 -0.62 -0.84 -0.90 -0.51 -0.22 -0.05 0.06 0.14
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Table 1.7: The Dynamic Cross-Correlation Pattern. The table shows the correlation coeﬃcients between
the wage bill per worker wtlt and output per worker yt+k/nt+k, lagged respectively leaded by k quarters.
U.S. Data -0.12 0.00 0.14 0.26 0.40 0.53 0.53 0.46 0.38 0.27 0.14
SB Model -0.17 -0.07 0.09 0.33 0.68 1.00 0.68 0.33 0.09 -0.06 -0.16
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Table 1.8: Business Cycle Statistics. For each variable, the table reports the relative standard deviation
(σX/σY ), the ﬁrst order autocorrelation (ρXT,XT+1), the phase shift relative to output (in parenthesis),
and the contemporaneous correlation with output (ρXY ).
c i nl n l w y/(nl) nwl (nl)/y
U.S. Business Cycle Facts
σY = 1.78
σX/σY 0.42 3.37 1.06 0.87 0.24 0.54 0.71 1.20 0.74
ρXT ,XT+1 0.75 0.83 0.91 0.90 0.74 0.84 0.84 0.91 0.85
ρXY (0) 0.81 (0) 0.97 (+1) 0.76 (+1) 0.82 (0) 0.77 (-1) 0.27 (-4) 0.27 (+1) 0.79 (-5) -0.07
Benchmark Model
σY = 1.32
σX/σY 0.42 2.37 0.68 0.79 0.17 0.26 0.63 0.86 0.26
ρXT ,XT+1 0.81 0.87 0.93 0.93 0.83 0.69 0.67 0.90 0.68
ρXY (0) 0.97 (0) 0.99 (+1) 0.88 (+1) 0.90 (+4) -0.03 (0) 0.88 (0) 0.78 (0) 0.97 (-1) -0.63
Table 1.9: The Dunlop-Tarshis observation. The table reports the correlation coeﬃcients between
employment nt and the wage bill per worker wtlt as well as the correlation coeﬃcients between total
hours ntlt and the real wage rate wt, respectively.
U.S. Data B’mark Model NB Model LC Model
ρ(nt, wtlt) 0.34 0.22 0.87 0.87
ρ(ntlt, wt) 0.03 0.55 0.98 0.88
Hertweck, Matthias S. (2010), Matching in a DSGE Framework 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/1503034 CHAPTER 1. STRATEGIC WAGE BARGAINING
Appendix 1.C Figures
Figure 1.1: Impulse Response Functions. The graphs depict the evolution of the benchmark model
(solid line), the NB model (dashed line), and the LC model (dotted line) over 96 months (32 quarters).
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Figure 1.2: Robust Hump-Shaped Vacancy Dynamics. The solid line represents the benchmark model.
The dashed line represents the NB model. The dot-dashed line represents the benchmark model with
ﬁrms’ bargaining power equal to unity. The dot-dot-dashed line represents the NB model with ﬁrms’
bargaining power equal to unity.
Figure 1.3: The Dynamic Beveridge Curve (graphical representation of table 1.6). The solid line with
square shaped markers represents U.S. data. The solid line with triangle-shaped markers represents the
benchmark model. The dashed line represents the NB model. The dotted line represents the LC model.
Figure 1.4: The Bargaining Set. The graphs depict the evolution of the reservation value of the ﬁrm
(upper graph), the wage bill per worker (middle graph) and the reservation value of the worker (lower
graph) over 12000 simulated periods. In addition, we highlight the steady state value of the worker’s
reservation value as well as its 95% conﬁdence interval.
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Chapter 2
Endogenous On-the-job Search and
Frictional Wage Dispersion
2.1 Introduction
This paper addresses the large degree of frictional wage dispersion found in US data
(Hornstein et al., 2007). The standard job matching model without on-the-job search
cannot replicate this pattern. With on-the-job search, however, unemployed job searchers
are more willing to accept low wage oﬀers since they can continue to seek for better
employment opportunities. This explains why observably identical workers may be paid
very diﬀerent wages. Therefore, we examine the quantitative implications of on-the-job
search (Nagypál, 2005) in a stochastic job matching model (Mortensen and Pissarides,
1994). Our key result is that the inclusion of variable on-the-job search increases the
degree of frictional wage dispersion by an order of a magnitude.
Hornstein et al. (2007) study frictional wage dispersion, i.e. wage diﬀerentials among
observably identical workers, using a “mean-min-ratio” which relates the average wage
paid to the lowest wage in the sample. They ﬁnd that the mean-min-ratio takes values of
1.7 and above in US data. Adopting the framework of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994),
the authors then examine the decision problem of an unemployed job searcher assuming
that there is no aggregate uncertainty. Each ﬁrm-worker pair is characterized by an
idiosyncratic productivity level. The worker and the ﬁrm form a match if and only
if it yields a positive surplus and the wage rate of the worker is determined by Nash
bargaining. Hornstein et al. (2007) demonstrate that unemployed job searchers are only
willing to accept low wage oﬀers if either (i) the job oﬀer arrival rate is very low or
(ii) the expected wage contract is very short. The former case implies that unemployed
workers desperately accept any wage oﬀer. Shimer (2007) estimates these values, where,
consistent with the model presented, the possibility of direct ﬂows from one employer to
another is not taken into account. He ﬁnds that 45% of all unemployed workers ﬁnd a
new job within one month, while the average job duration is estimated to be about 2
1/2 years. Using these estimates, Hornstein et al. (2007) ﬁnd that the model generated
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mean-min-ratio is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity.
This paper considers frictional wage dispersion in a model with on-the-job search. This
seems to be a natural choice, given that the number of employed workers who change
employer each month is about twice as large as the ﬂow of unemployed job searchers
into employment (Fallick and Fleischman, 2004). The introduction of direct employment-
to-employment1 transitions has the potential to increase the degree of frictional wage
dispersion for two reasons. First, unemployed job searchers who accept (temporarily) a
low-wage job oﬀer do not lose the option of labor market search. Hence, they may accept
low wage oﬀers for the moment, but continue to seek for better employment opportunities.
This implies that a high degree of frictional wage dispersion and a high value of the average
job ﬁnding rate may coexist at the same time. Second, Nagypál (2008) ﬁnds that average
wage contract duration is overestimated when employment-to-employment transitions are
not taken into account.
In particular, we modify the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) set up as follows. Each
ﬁrm-worker pair is characterized by its idiosyncratic productivity level, which is constant
throughout the whole duration of the match. Search eﬀort of both employed and un-
employed job searchers is endogenous. All ﬁrm-worker matches are subject to exogenous
and endogenous job separation hazard. Variations in the endogenous job separation mar-
gin are driven by aggregate productivity shocks. On-the-job search is motivated by the
chance of ﬁnding a better job opportunity that promises (i) a higher real wage rate and
(ii) a lower hazard of endogenous separation. An unemployed job searcher accepts any
job oﬀer, while an employed job searcher accepts a job oﬀer (and quits the old job) only
if it includes a higher surplus share.
We calibrate the model in order to match the empirical evidence presented in Nagypál
(2008). Accordingly, conditional on not leaving the labor force, about 2/3 of all work-
ers who separate from their employer are matched with a new one in the following
month. In addition to that, the assumption of variable on-the-job search and endoge-
nous job separation shocks helps us to replicate the observation that on-the-job search
is most intense among workers in low-wage matches close to the separation margin
(Fallick and Fleischman, 2004; Christensen et al., 2005). Thus, our model is consistent
with the empirical observation that (i) employment-to-employment transition rates are
highest in matches that pay low wages and (ii) the aggregate employment-to-employment
transition rate is slightly below the value of 3%.
High employment-to-employment transition rates imply that low-wage matches exhibit
a high option value of labor market search. This stimulates unemployed job searchers to
accept such oﬀers and to search on-the-job for better employment opportunities. More-
over, we note that the expected duration of low-wage job matches is far below the aver-
1Our paper addresses only transitions of workers from one employer to another. We do not consider
promotions within a given ﬁrm.
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age. Consequently, our calibrated model is able to generate a mean-min-ratio equal to
1.3. Compared to the value provided by Hornstein et al. (2007), the percentage diﬀerence
between the average and the lowest wage paid rises by an order of a magnitude. There-
fore, we conclude that the introduction of variable on-the-job search into a model with
endogenous job separations is an eﬀective means to generate frictional wage dispersion.
In addition, we examine the dynamic behavior of the model at the business cycle fre-
quencies. Our analysis focuses on the cyclical movements of vacancies, unemployment,
and the real wage rate. Interest in this issue has been sparked by the inﬂuential paper
of Shimer (2005), which states that the job matching model with exogenous separations
(Pissarides, 1985) is not able to replicate the high degree of labor market volatility. Fur-
thermore, Mortensen and Nagypál (2008) point out that counter-cyclical ﬂuctuations in
the endogenous separation margin are able to amplify the variations in the number of un-
employed job searchers on the one hand. On the other hand, these strong counter-cyclical
movements provide ﬁrms incentives to open more vacancies during economic downturns.
Hence, the model generated Beveridge curve may be counter-factually positively sloped.
In our model, on the contrary, variable on-the-job search uncouples aggregate search ef-
fort from the number of unemployed job searchers. Since on-the-job search is pro-cyclical,
we note that total search eﬀort, i.e. the sum of all eﬀort undertaken by employed and
unemployed job searchers, is relatively stable over the business cycle. This stimulates
ﬁrms to open more vacancies when aggregate productivity is high. As a consequence, our
model is able to replicate a negatively sloped Beveridge curve.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model
environment. Section 2.3 calibrates the model and evaluates its quantitative performance
against US data. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 The Model Environment
2.2.1 Employment Relationships
There is a continuum of ex-ante identical workers in the economy, having unit mass
and a continuum of potential ﬁrms, having inﬁnite mass. Both ﬁrms and workers are
risk-neutral. Production takes place in one-ﬁrm-one-worker matches. Each active match
produces output according to a linear technology: y(a,t) = azt. We assume that match-
speciﬁc idiosyncratic productivity level a is constant throughout the whole duration of
the match. The exogenous distribution of a is described by the cumulative distribution
function P(a) with support [0,∞). Aggregate productivity zt, instead, is subject to an
exogenous shock speciﬁed by following autoregressive process:
ln(zt) = (1 − ̺)ln(¯ z) + ̺ln(zt−1) + ǫt with ǫt ∼ N(0,σ
2
ǫ) and iid. (2.1)
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2.2.2 The Labor Market
In the beginning of period t, there are Nt matched ﬁrm-worker pairs. The endogenous
distribution of ﬁrm-worker pairs over idiosyncratic productivity levels is described by a
cumulative distribution function G(a,t) with support [0,∞). All ﬁrm-worker pairs face
exogenous separation with probability ρx. In addition, a match may be separated if its
idiosyncratic productivity level is below the current reservation productivity ar,t. Workers
who lose their job, whether for exogenous or endogenous reasons, immediately enter the
period t matching pool. Hence, the unemployment rate Ut is given by the share of workers
who are not engaged in active employment relationships:2





Labor market search takes place parallel to production. The pool of job searchers
comprises all unemployed and all employed workers who search on-the-job for better
employment opportunities. Search eﬀort of both, unemployed and employed job searchers,
is endogenous. Unemployed job searchers are identical and, hence, search all with the
same intensity eu,t on the labor market. The search eﬀort of an employed worker ew(a,t)
depends on her idiosyncratic productivity level a. Thus, aggregate search eﬀort Et is
given by:





Search eﬀort of unemployed and employed job searchers incurs a cost. In particular,
we assume that the respective cost functions are given as:
c[eu,t] = ζu [eu,t]
φu , c[ew(a,t)] = ζw [ew(a,t)]
φw ,
where the parameter φi, i = u,w captures the fact that the level and the curvature of the
search cost function may depend on the employment status.
Besides the pool of job searchers, the period t matching market consists of the aggre-
gate number of vacancies Vt. Firms with unﬁlled positions may decide whether or not to
post a vacancy, where posting a vacancy entails a cost κ per period. Free entry into the
matching market determines the aggregate number of posted vacancies.
New matches are formed at the end of period t. The number of newly formed ﬁrm-
worker pairs is given by a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale.











where χ is a constant scaling factor.
2Our model abstracts from movements into and out of the labor force.
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The ratio between aggregate vacancies and aggregate search eﬀort measures the tight-
ness of the labor market. By linear homogeneity of the matching function, the matching
probability per unit search eﬀort f(θt), and the matching rate per vacancy q(θt), respec-




















The tighter the labor market, the longer the expected time to ﬁll a vacancy, but
the shorter the expected search for a job (and vice versa). The fact that ﬁrms and
households do not internalize these adverse eﬀects on the aggregate return rates gives rise
to congestion externalities.
Labor market search and match formation entails that the employment distribution











x)(1 − τ(a,t))Ntg(a,t) +
(1 − ρ
x)Ntf(θt)











where I is an indicator function equal to zero if a is below the current reservation pro-
ductivity ar,t, and otherwise equal to one. The right hand side of equation (2.4) is made
up of (i) the mass of unemployed job searchers who succeed in meeting an employer, (ii)
the distribution of workers in existing job matches that experience neither job separation
nor a transition (with probability 1 − τ(a,t)) to a new employer and, (iii) the distribu-
tion of new job matches established by successful employment-to-employment transitions.
Evaluating equation (2.4) at a → ∞ yields a more familiar law of motion:
Nt+1 = (1 − ρ
x)Nt[1 − G(ar,t)] + f(θt)eu,tUt.
2.2.3 The Joint Surplus
Let the value of unemployment to a worker be Ut, the value of a vacancy to a ﬁrm be
Vt, the value of a match to a worker be W(a,t), and the value of a match to a ﬁrm be
J(a,t). Hence, the joint surplus of an active match S(a,t) is given by the value of output
y(a,t), net of expenses for search on-the-job c[ew(a,t)] and the joint outside alternative
(Ut + Vt), plus the joint continuation value of the current match C(a,t) in the future:
S(a,t) = y(a,t) − c[ew(a,t)] − (Ut + Vt) + C(a,t). (2.5)
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The joint surplus is divided by Nash (1953) bargaining. Consequently, the ﬁrm gains
period-by-period the ﬁxed portion ξ, while the share 1 − ξ is allocated to the worker.
We assume that wage bargaining takes place in the beginning of period t, but after the
employed worker has made her search decision. This timing assumption has two important
implications. First, employed workers who have just made a transition to a new employer
are not able to resume their old position. Therefore, the outside alternative of all workers
is equal to the value of unemployment. Second, the bargaining outcome does not inﬂuence
the search decision of the worker. Thus, the surplus shares are given as:3
ξS(a,t) = J(a,t) − Vt, (1 − ξ)S(a,t) = W(a,t) − Ut. (2.6)
Equation (2.6) shows that the surplus share of the ﬁrm equals the value of an active
match to the ﬁrm J(a,t) net of the value of an unﬁlled vacancy Vt. The surplus share
of the worker equals the value of an active match to the worker W(a,t) net of the value
of unemployment Ut. Furthermore, the Nash sharing rule implies that any endogenous
separation decision is made by mutual consent. Consequently, the current reservation
productivity ar,t has to satisfy the following job separation condition:
S(ar,t,t) = 0 ⇔ y(ar,t,t) − c[ew(ar,t,t)] + C(ar,t,t) = Ut + Vt.
2.2.4 The Problem of an Unemployed Job Searcher
We now examine the decision problem of an unemployed job searcher. There is a contin-
uum of ex-ante unemployed job searchers in the economy, having mass Ut. All unemployed
job searchers take the aggregate matching rate per unit search eﬀort ft as given and search
eu,t units on the labor market. Hence, an unemployed job searcher can expect to meet a
ﬁrm at the rate:
˜ f(eu,t,θt) = fteu,t. (2.7)
When an unemployed job searcher meets a ﬁrm at the end of period t, the pair draws
its idiosyncratic productivity level a, which is constant throughout the whole duration
of the match. Given that next period’s reservation productivity ar,t+1 is still unknown,
unemployed job searchers accept every match for the moment. If the match survives
3The present timing assumption is clearly a simpliﬁcation. However, to our knowledge, there is
no study investigating all aspects of a multi-player bargaining game under variable on-the-job search.
Cahuc et al. (2006) examine the implications of a multi-player bargaining game, where the search intensity
of employed job searchers is constant (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). They demonstrate that between-
ﬁrm competition increases the average wage rate if employed job searchers can resume their old positions.
Papp (2009) examines the implications of this approach in a general equilibrium model. On the other
hand, Shimer (2006) analyzes a strategic bargaining game between an employed job searcher and a single
ﬁrm, where the ﬁrm is willing to oﬀer a higher wage rate in order to reduce the extent of transitions to
other employers. Indeed, the examination of these questions in a stochastic environment is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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exogenous destruction at the beginning of period t+1, the ﬁrm and the worker observe the
realization of aggregate productivity zt+1 and decide upon endogenous separation. Only
if the idiosyncratic productivity of the ﬁrm-worker match is greater than the reservation
productivity a > ar,t+1, the match will become active. Thereby, the reservation strategy
of the worker implies that she gains at least the value of unemployment Ut+1. This setup





where W(a,t) = Ut below the reservation productivity ar,t. Hence, W(a,t) captures not
only the value of active matches, but also the value of matches that are endogenously














Each worker who is not engaged in an active employment relationship receives the
ﬂow income b, net of c[eu,t] units search costs. Future utility is discounted at the rate β.
The worker expects to ﬁnd an average job in period t + 1 with probability (1 − ρx) ˜ ft.
In this case, the worker gains the expected surplus share (Wt+1 − Ut+1). In addition, the
unemployed worker will receive at least the value of unemployment Ut+1 – independent of
whether or not she succeeds in ﬁnding an active employment relationship.
Consequently, the search eﬀort choice eu,t of an unemployed worker has to satisfy
following ﬁrst order condition:
c






The ﬁrst order condition of an unemployed worker states that the marginal costs of
labor market search (the left hand side) must be equal to the marginal beneﬁts (the right
hand side). The latter is given by the matching rate per unit labor market search ft,
the exogenous destruction rate ρx, and the expected present value of the worker’s surplus
share.
2.2.5 The Problem of an Employed Job Searcher
Employed workers who search on-the-job for better employment opportunities face the
same meeting rate per unit search eﬀort ft as unemployed job searchers. The search eﬀort
of an employed worker, however, depends on her idiosyncratic productivity level a. Thus,
the expected meeting rate of an employed job searcher is given as: ftew(a,t). Moreover,
the reservation strategy of an employed worker implies that she accepts matches at the
end of period t only if the idiosyncratic productivity of the new match ˆ a is strictly larger
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than the one of the old match a. Otherwise, she remains on her old job. Given that the
idiosyncratic productivity level of new matches is drawn from the exogenous distribution
P(a), the current setting implies that an employed job searcher of type a rejects new job
oﬀers at the rate P(a). Hence, the expected employment-to-employment transition rate
of an employed worker with idiosyncratic productivity a reads as:
τ(a,t) = ftew(a,t)[1 − P(a)]. (2.11)









(1 − τ(a,t))(1 − ρ
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The worker’s value of a match W(a,t) is given by the real wage rate wa,t, net of
expenses for search on-the-job c[ew(a,t)], and the continuation value of the match to the
worker. The worker’s continuation value is given by (i) the expected surplus share of
the current employment relationship, (ii) the expected surplus share of a prospective job
opportunity with higher (ˆ a > a) idiosyncratic productivity, and (iii) the expected present
value of unemployment (the minimum gain of the worker). The ﬁrst term (i) refers
to the worker who does not ﬁnd a better employment opportunity, but suﬀers neither
exogenous nor endogenous job destruction. The second term (ii) characterizes the worker
who succeeds in ﬁnding a better job opportunity which survives exogenous and endogenous
job destruction. The third term (iii) applies if the current or the prospective employment
relationship is terminated either for exogenous or endogenous reasons.
When employed workers make their search eﬀort decision, they anticipate the Nash
wage rate w(a,t) correctly. Wage bargaining, however, does not start until the search
eﬀort decision has been made.4 Hence, the optimal search intensity of an employed
worker with idiosyncratic productivity a is given by following ﬁrst order condition:
c
′[ew(a,t)] = ft(1 − ρ
x)βEt
   ∞
a
 





Equation (2.13) shows that the search intensity of employed workers decreases in the
idiosyncratic productivity level a. The expected upgrading value W(ˆ a,t+1)−W(a,t+1),
which is determined by the expected surplus from a prospective job opportunity ˆ a given
4See Footnote (3).
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the value of the current job a, is highest if the idiosyncratic productivity level a is slightly
above the current reservation productivity level ar,t. Workers engaged in these matches
fear to loose their job in the case of a negative shock to aggregate productivity.
2.2.6 Optimal Vacancy Posting
There is an inﬁnite mass of ﬁrms with unﬁlled positions. Each ﬁrm with an unﬁlled
position may decide whether or not to post a vacancy. Equation (2.3) shows that a ﬁrm
with an open vacancy expects to meet a job searcher at rate q(θt). However, the ﬁrm
anticipates the possibility of meeting an employed job searcher who might reject the job
oﬀer in favor of her old job. Hence, the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy ˜ qt is given by
the probability of meeting a worker q(θt), the job oﬀer acceptance rate (1 − ρ
j
t), and the
exogenous separation rate ρx:








where the share of rejected job oﬀers ρ
j
t is given by the number of rejected job oﬀers












Since next period’s reservation productivity is still unknown, the ﬁrm accepts matches
of any idiosyncratic productivity level a for the moment. When the worker and the ﬁrm
decide whether to engage in production in period t + 1, the reservation strategy of the
ﬁrm ensures that the value of the match is greater or equal to the value of an unﬁlled





where the value of a match to the ﬁrm J(a,t) can be written as:
J(a,t) = y(a,t) − w(a,t) + βEt {(1 − τ(a,t))(1 − ρ
x)J(a,t + 1)}. (2.17)
The ﬁrm enjoys the value of production, net of labor costs w(a,t). The ﬁrm’s con-
tinuation value is determined by the current employment-to-employment transition rate
τ(a,t), the exogenous job destruction rate ρx, and the expected present value of the current
match in the next period. Furthermore, we note that J(a,t) = Vt below the reservation
productivity ar,t. Hence, J(a,t) measures not only the value of active matches, but also
the value of matches that are consensually terminated. Hence, the value of an unﬁlled
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vacancy is given by:
Vt = −κ + βEt
 
˜ qtJ t+1 + (1 − ˜ qt)Vt+1
 
. (2.18)
Recall that posting a vacancy entails a cost κ per period. Therefore, the ﬁrm expects to
gain the value of a ﬁlled vacancy J t with probability ˜ qt. Otherwise, the vacancy remains
unﬁlled. Free entry into the matching market ensures that the ﬁrm’s outside option, i.e.
the value of an unﬁlled vacancy, is zero in every period: Vt = 0. Thus, the number of
posted vacancies has to satisfy following condition:
κ
˜ qt
= βEtJ t+1. (2.19)
2.2.7 The Wage Function
Using the Nash sharing rule (2.6), the value of a match to the worker (2.12), and the
value of a match to the ﬁrm (2.17), the joint surplus of the match (2.5) can be rewritten
as follows:
S(a,t) = y(a,t) − c[e
∗
w(a,t)] − Ut − Vt + (2.20)
βEt
  















w(a,t) satisﬁes equation (2.13).
Equation (2.20) shows that the joint continuation value of the match consists of (i)
the option value of the current match, (ii) the option value of on-the-job search, and (iii)
the option value of unemployment. Thereby, only the beneﬁts of on-the-job search going
to the worker (1 − ξ)S(ˆ a,t + 1) enter the mutual surplus, while the beneﬁts going to the
new employer ξS(ˆ a,t + 1) are not taken into account. Furthermore, the Nash bargaining
solution entails following real wage function, depending on the idiosyncratic productivity
level a:
w(a,t) = (1 − ξ)y(a,t) + ξ (c[e
∗












The real wage rate is given by the weighted average of (i) the value of production
and (ii) the value of unemployment, plus compensation for search on-the-job, minus the
option value of on-the-job search to the worker. The positive option value to the worker
reduces her reservation wage. Therefore, we observe that the Nash wage in our model
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with on-the-job search is lower than in the baseline matching model.
2.2.8 Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is given by the unemployment rate Ut, the aggregate number
of vacancies Vt, the search eﬀort of unemployed workers eu,t, the function of employed
workers’ search eﬀort ew(a,t), the distribution of ﬁrm-worker matches G(a,t), and a wage
function w(a,t), such that:
• Ut and W(a,t) are the value of unemployment and of a match, respectively, for
workers making optimal search eﬀort decisions, given Ut, Vt, Et, w(a,t), and G(a,t).
ew(a,t) and eu,t are the corresponding optimal search eﬀort policies.
• Vt and J(a,t) are the value of a vacancy and of a match for ﬁrms making optimal
vacancy creation decisions, given Ut, Vt, Et, w(a,t), ew(a,t), eu,t, and G(a,t).
• Total factor productivity zt follows the exogenous stochastic process (2.1).
• There is free entry into the matching pool of vacancies.
• New ﬁrm-worker matches draw their idiosyncratic productivity a from an exoge-
nously given distribution P(a).
• Wages are set by sharing the surplus of an active ﬁrm-worker match in fractions ξ
and 1 − ξ, respectively, given the wage function w(a,t).
• The distribution G(a,t), the unemployment rate Ut, the aggregate number of va-
cancies Vt, and the total search eﬀort Et are consistent with the decisions of the
agents in the economy.
• An initial condition for the share of matched ﬁrm worker pairs N0 is given.
2.3 Model Evaluation
2.3.1 Computational Issues
We analyze the cyclical properties of the model economy by value function iteration on a
discrete state space. Thereby, the treatment of the endogenous productivity distribution
as an endogenous state variable establishes a computational challenge. Particularly, as
in the case of endogenous separations the endogenous productivity distribution exhibits
a discontinuity at the reservation productivity ar,t. This might be the reason why only
a small number of authors so far have addressed the issue of on-the-job search in a job
matching model. Among others, Nagypál (2005) examines the stationary equilibrium of
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a job matching model with variable on-the-job search, where idiosyncratic productivity
shocks lead to endogenous separations. She concludes that workers close to the endoge-
nous separation margin show the highest intensity of on-the-job search. In a companion
paper, Nagypál (2007) considers a log-linear approximation around the non-stochastic
steady state. However, in order to ensure diﬀerentiability of the endogenous distribu-
tion, the model drops the assumption of endogenous separations. On the contrary, Fahr
(2007) argues that ﬁrm-worker pairs are subject to noisy signals about the idiosyncratic
productivity level. This implies that some proﬁtable matches separate endogenously by
mistake, while some non-proﬁtable matches are continued. Thus, the discontinuity at the
reservation productivity may be smoothed out by a logistic distribution. For this reason,
the model with on-the-job search and endogenous separations can be solved by a linear
approximation. Tasci (2007) extends the model by Pries and Rogerson (2005) in order
to allow for exogenous on-the-job search. In this setting, it suﬃces to approximate the
worker’s acceptance probability. For this purpose, the algorithm by Krusell and Smith
(1998) is utilized. Krause and Lubik (2007) assume segregated markets for good and
bad jobs, where separations are exogenous and constant in both market segments. Fi-
nally, Menzio and Shi (2009) introduce on-the-job search into a model of directed search
akin to Moen (1997). They demonstrate that, in this setting, the agents’ decisions are
independent of the endogenous productivity distribution.
Instead, our approach is based on the observation that, in the US, the half life de-
viation of the actual unemployment rate from its stationary value is close to one month
(Elsby et al., 2009). Consequently, the correlation between the stationary rate and the
actual unemployment rate in the following month is very close to unity (Shimer, 2007).
Since the lag is so short, Hall (2009) suggests neglecting the fact that the unemployment
rate is governed by a backward-looking law of motion. In addition, as described above, we
note that the ﬂow of workers from one employer to another is more than twice as large as
the ﬂow from unemployment to employment. For this reason, we treat neither the unem-
ployment rate nor the corresponding endogenous productivity distribution as endogenous
state variables. The only state variable in our model is aggregate productivity.
2.3.2 Calibration
In order to capture the high transition rates in the US economy, we calibrate the model
so that one period corresponds to one month. When simulating the model, we time-
aggregate the artiﬁcial series to quarterly data and evaluate it against the quarterly US
time series. Table 2.1 summarizes the parameter values of our model.
Preferences Workers are risk-neutral and supply labor inelastically. The discount fac-
tor β is chosen to match an annual real interest rate of 4 percent (Kydland and Prescott,
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1982). Furthermore, estimates by Christensen et al. (2005) and Yashiv (2000) for em-
ployed and unemployed job searchers, respectively, indicate that both types of job search-
ers face a quadratic cost of search eﬀort, i.e. φe = φu = 2 and ζe = ζu = 1/2.
Matching and the Labor Market We target an average unemployment rate U =
10% and a workers’ meeting rate ˜ ft = 27% (Hall, 2005). These ﬁgures refer to the
oﬃcially unemployed job searchers plus the pool of marginally attached non-participants
(Jones and Riddell, 1999). Our calibrated value of unemployment beneﬁts b = 0.85,
together with the implied average value of search disutility (c[e∗
w] = 0.14) and average
output per worker ¯ y = 1.25, yields a replacement rate equal to 0.56. This value lies within
the range found in the literature.5 Targets for the transition rate out of employment are
provided by Hall (2005). Therefore, we set the exogenous separation rate ρx to 0.0275.
Furthermore, our calibration implies that the endogenous separation rate ρn is close to
0.01, and the average employment-to-employment transition rate τ is equal to 0.04. Beside
that, we choose the ﬁrm’s bargaining power ξ = 0.25 and the per-period vacancy posting
cost κ = 0.06, such that the unemployment rate and the percentage of vacancy posting
costs in aggregate output (κV )/Y = 1.9% are in line with our targets. The latter value
implies that the steady-state asset value of a match to the ﬁrm is equal to 19% of average
output (Yashiv, 2000). Finally, we calibrate the two parameters of the matching function.
First, we set the matching function constant χ equal to 0.45.6 Second, we calibrate
the matching elasticity of vacancies η equal to 0.5, which is within the plausible range
[0.3 − 0.5] proposed by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
Productivity We approximate the stochastic process (Equation 2.1) with a discrete
valued ﬁrst-order Markov process using the method by Tauchen (1986). Thereby, we use
the values (̺ = 0.97,σǫ = 0.007) suggested by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).7 The
number of grid points in the state space is set equal to 29. The exogenous productivity
distribution is assumed to be log-normal with mean   = 1 and a standard deviation equal
to σp = 0.1. We compute the exogenous and the endogenous productivity distribution,
P(a) and G(a) respectively, on a very ﬁne grid with 500 points between 0.7 and 1.5.
5The value used by Shimer (2005), b = 0.4, comprises only pecuniary beneﬁts and, thus, is consid-
ered to be a lower bound. Values beyond are usually justiﬁed by the reference to “leisure gain from
unemployment”. Angerhausen et al. (2009) provide a microfoundation for this claim, while the results of
Costain and Reiter (2008) indicate that this “gain” is quantitatively important. An upper bound is pro-
vided by the estimate b = 0.95 of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), who attempt to match the elasticity
of the real wage rate.
6As argued by Shimer (2005), the model allows the normalization of this value.
7The published version of the model is calibrated so that one period corresponds to one week. Please re-
fer to the working paper version (available at: http://www.econ.umn.edu/macro/2005/hagedorn.pdf)
for the monthly calibration.
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2.3.3 Steady State Analysis
The Endogenous Productivity Distribution Figure (2.1a) displays the probability
density function of the exogenous productivity distribution P(a), represented by a blue
line, as well as the endogenous productivity distribution at 5 diﬀerent levels of aggre-
gate productivity (at grid points 1, 8, 15, 22, and 29), after endogenous separation has
taken place. Grid point 15 (turquoise line) represents the stochastic steady state. The
graph clearly shows that the positive selection of employed workers towards matches with
higher idiosyncratic productivity shifts the endogenous distribution to the right. In the
steady state, average match quality is about 25% higher than the mean of the exogenous
productivity distribution. Moreover, we note that the impact of aggregate productiv-
ity on average match quality follows a non-linear pattern (Figure 2.1b). The slope of
the right tail is much steeper than the slope of the left tail. This suggests that the
channel from aggregate productivity to average match quality is shaped by two oppos-
ing eﬀects. On the one hand, recessions destroy low-quality matches which are likely to
be proﬁtable during economic upswings. This is referred to as the “cleansing” eﬀect of
recessions (Caballero and Hammour, 1994). On the other hand, we observe that search
intensity of on-the-job searchers is pro-cyclical (Figure 2.1d). Consequently, the number
of employment-to-employment transitions is pro-cyclical as well (Figure 2.1f). This im-
plies that recessions are times when workers tend to stay in low quality matches. Barlevy
(2002) refers to this as the “sullying” eﬀect of recessions. In our calibrated model, the “sul-
lying” eﬀect is dominant. Therefore, average match quality is pro-cyclical. Nevertheless,
the ﬂat shape of the left tail shows that also the “cleansing” eﬀect is present.
The Average Real Wage Rate The evolution of average match quality over the
business cycle has important implications for the dynamic behavior of the real wage rate.
In the presence of period-by-period Nash bargaining, both variables are linked very closely.
This is manifested by Figure 2.1b. Individual wages, instead, increase monotonously in
aggregate productivity (Figure 2.1g). This ﬁnding indicates that our model may be able
to match an important empirical observation. Several authors, among others Solon et al.
(1994), Bowlus et al. (2002) and Hart (2006), report that individual wage proﬁles are
strongly pro-cyclical. Aggregate data, however, show (at most) a weakly pro-cyclical
pattern. The literature argues that the apparent discrepancy is due to the fact that
aggregate data often neglects the cyclical variations in the average match quality. Our
model seems to be consistent with this claim.
Frictional Wage Dispersion Furthermore, we observe that the real wage rate paid
in the least productive active match is essentially independent of aggregate productivity
(Figure 2.1g). Consequently, the ratio between the average and the lowest wage paid
in the economy, the so-called “mean-min-ratio”, follows a similar pattern as the average
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real wage rate (Figure 2.1h). The mean-min-ratio measures the degree of frictional wage
dispersion, i.e. wage diﬀerentials among ex-ante identical workers. Hornstein et al. (2007)
demonstrate that the job matching model without on-the-job search is unable to match
the high degree of frictional wage dispersion found in the data. In the US, the average
wage paid to similar workers is about 70% higher than the lowest wage within the set.
In contrast, the mean-min ratio generated by a reasonably calibrated version of the job
matching model without on-the-job search is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity. In
our calibrated model, the steady state value of the mean-min-ratio is equal to 1.4. Thus,
our model is able to explain about one-half of the empirical degree of frictional wage
dispersion.
Hornstein et al. (2007) argue that the inclusion of on-the-job search is essential for gen-
erating these results. In the presence of high job ﬁnding rates, unemployed job searchers
have no incentive to accept a long-term job that pays a low wage rate. With on-the-
job search, employed workers are more likely to accept low wage oﬀers for the moment
and continue to seek for better employment opportunities. However, a model with exoge-
nous on-the-job search (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998) requires far too high EE-transition
rates in order to replicate the degree of frictional wage dispersion found in the data. For
this reason, we introduce variable on-the-job search and endogenous separations. These
two modiﬁcations allow us to concentrate on-the-job search among workers in low qual-
ity matches. These workers have (i) a large probability of ﬁnding a better employment
opportunity and (ii) a high probability of entering unemployment. Therefore, our model
is able to generate signiﬁcant frictional wage dispersion. At the same time, the share of
employed workers who change employer each month is very close to the empirical value
of 3% (Figure 2.1f).
On-the-Job Search Figure (2.1c) illustrates the search eﬀort decision of employed and
unemployed job searchers, respectively. The horizontal lines represent the eﬀort per un-
employed job searcher, which depends only on the level of aggregate productivity. The
search eﬀort choice of employed job searchers, instead, is a function of aggregate and
idiosyncratic productivity. As expected, search eﬀort of any type of worker rises with ag-
gregate productivity, while search eﬀort of employed job searchers falls with idiosyncratic
productivity. This happens for two reasons. First, the probability of ﬁnding a better
employment opportunity is smaller the higher the quality of the current match. Second,
the hazard of endogenous job separation decreases with the distance to the current reser-
vation productivity. We observe that the search behavior of an employed worker at the
reservation productivity (the “marginal” worker) is almost identical to the search behavior
of an unemployed. Due to the low reservation productivity, these workers are (i) likely to
ﬁnd a better employment opportunity and (ii) face a huge endogenous separation hazard
in the case of a negative productivity shock. Moreover, we note that the bulk of employed
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workers, i.e. workers in matches with idiosyncratic productivity a > 1.1, do not make any
signiﬁcant eﬀort to ﬁnd a new employer. This observation is consistent with the ﬁndings
by Fallick and Fleischman (2004) and Christensen et al. (2005).
Total search eﬀort, i.e. the sum of all eﬀort undertaken by employed and unemployed
job searchers, seems to be relatively stable (Figure 2.1d). The composition, however,
changes considerably over the business cycle. Search eﬀort of employed job searchers
rises with aggregate productivity, since there are more on-the-job searchers (extensive
margin) who search more than the employed workers already in place (intensive margin).
In particular, note that the search eﬀort of a given employed worker increases only by
little when economic conditions improve. This indicates that escaping from imminent
unemployment is probably the main motive for on-the-job search. In addition to that,
we observe that aggregate search eﬀort of unemployed job searchers is counter-cyclical.
Even though the search intensity per unemployed job searcher rises (intensive margin, see
Figure 2.1c), the number of unemployed job searchers declines sharply during economic
upswings (extensive margin, see Figure 2.2b). This implies that a ﬁrm is much more likely
to meet an employed job searcher when aggregate productivity is high.
Employment-to-Employment Transitions Figure (2.1e) presents the rates at which
employed workers ﬁnd new employers. Given that the meeting rate per unit search eﬀort
is not very elastic, EE-transition rates follow the same pattern as search intensity of
employed workers. Consequently, marginal workers enjoy almost the same transition
probability (well above 30%) as unemployed job searchers during economic booms (grid
point 29). During recessions (grid point 1), on the contrary, the EE-transition rate of
marginal workers is only slightly above 10%. The job ﬁnding rate of unemployed job
searchers, on the other hand, never falls below a value of 25%. The huge diﬀerences
in the transition probabilities of marginal workers may help to explain the shape of the
endogenous productivity distribution at the reservation productivity (Figure 2.1a). When
aggregate productivity is low, the endogenous productivity distribution exhibits a clear
cut-oﬀ point. Yet, when aggregate productivity is high, we observe that the endogenous
productivity distribution is very smooth.
Aggregate Labor Market Dynamics In addition, our model allows analyzing the
cyclical behavior of the labor market. Interest in this issue has been sparked by the
inﬂuential paper of Shimer (2005). The survey paper by Yashiv (2008) provides a gen-
eral picture of US labor market dynamics over the business cycle. Accordingly, gross
worker ﬂows between employment and unemployment are counter-cyclical and volatile.
On the one hand, counter-cyclical ﬂows from employment to unemployment are driven
by counter-cyclical movements in the job separation margin (Fujita, 2009). On the other
hand, counter-cyclical ﬂows from unemployment to employment are due to the fact that
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the percentage fall in the job ﬁnding rate is smaller than the percentage rise in the unem-
ployment rate in the aftermath of a negative productivity shock (Fallick and Fleischman,
2004). This implies that the number of unemployed job searchers is strongly counter-
cyclical. As pointed out by Mortensen and Nagypál (2008), such a scenario might give
ﬁrms incentives to open more vacancies during economic downturns. Hence, the model
generated Beveridge curve may be counter-factually positively sloped. In the case of
variable on-the-job search, however, total search eﬀort is uncoupled from the number of
unemployed job searchers. For this reason, strong counter-cyclical movements in the ag-
gregate unemployment rate do not necessarily induce counter-cyclical variations in the
number of posted vacancies.
Figure (2.2a) shows that gross worker ﬂows between employment and unemployment
are, indeed, counter-cyclical.8 The ﬂow of employed workers into unemployment is de-
termined by exogenous and endogenous separation (Figure 2.2d).9 The graph depicting
the aggregate unemployment rate (Figure 2.2b) clearly demonstrates that the number of
unemployed job searchers rises during economic downturns.
The ﬂow of workers from unemployment into employment, as displayed in Figure
(2.2a), represents all unemployed job searchers that succeed in meeting an employer at
the end of period t − 1. Since the reservation productivity at time t is still unknown,
unemployed job searchers accept matches of any quality for the moment. Whether meet-
ing an employer actually results in ﬁnding an active match in period t, depends on the
realization of aggregate productivity. Therefore, Figure (2.2c) gives the worker’s expected
meeting rate, represented by a blue line, and the job ﬁnding rate, represented by a pink
line. We observe that both transition rates are pro-cyclical. This is due to the fact that
more unemployed job searchers compete for fewer vacancies during economic downturns.
Moreover, the counter-cyclical ﬂow in Figure (2.2a) suggests that the percentage rise in
the number of unemployed job searchers is larger than the percentage fall in the worker’s
meeting rate.
Turning to the set of unmatched ﬁrms that have posted a vacancy (Figure 2.2e), we
note that there are three diﬀerent transition rates. The ﬁrms’ meeting rate, represented
by a blue line, gives the rate at which a ﬁrm can expect to meet a worker at the end of
period t − 1. As some employed job searchers will immediately reject the oﬀer (Figure
2.2f), the pink line gives the rate at which a ﬁrm can expect to be matched with a worker
at the beginning of period t. In addition to that, some matches will be separated in the
beginning of period t, due to exogenous and endogenous job separation. Hence, the yellow
8All graphs in Figure (2.2) represent stationary values, given diﬀerent values of aggregate productivity.
Consequently, the ﬂow from employment to unemployment is always identical to the ﬂow into the opposite
direction.
9As the graphs depict stationary values, all endogenous separations at time t are due to newly formed
matches in period t−1 that do not become active in period t. In addition to that, we observe a spike in
the endogenous separation rate every time the level of aggregate productivity decreases.
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line shows at which rate a ﬁrm can actually expect to ﬁnd an active job match in period t.
Finally, note that the introduction of variable on-the-job search uncouples aggregate
search eﬀort from the number of unemployed job searchers (Figure 2.1d). For this reason,
the ratio of vacancies to the number of unemployed job searchers is no longer identical
to “labor market tightness”, i.e. the ratio of vacancies to total search eﬀort. Since on-
the-job search is pro-cyclical, we observe that total search eﬀort, i.e. the sum of all
eﬀort undertaken by employed and unemployed job searchers, is relatively stable over the
business cycle. This stimulates ﬁrms to open more vacancies when aggregate productivity
is high (Figure 2.2h). Consequently, we observe that the ratio of vacancies to unemployed
job searchers is clearly pro-cyclical (Figure 2.2g). Labor market tightness, instead, is much
less elastic. This indicates that the negative feedback eﬀect of labor market tightness on
vacancy creation, which prevails in the standard job matching model, is much weaker in
a model with variable on-the-job search.
In summary, we notice that our model replicates salient features of the US labor
market. Gross worker ﬂows between employment and unemployment are counter-cyclical.
Vacancies are pro-cyclical, while the number of unemployed job searchers is counter-
cyclical. Hence, the model generated Beveridge curve is positively sloped.
2.3.4 Business Cycle Analysis
This section examines the quantitative performance of the job matching model with vari-
able on-the-job search. We evaluate the model against business cycle moments of the
US labor market from 1955:1 to 2008:4 (Table 2.2a). All data are logged and de-trended
using a Hodrick and Prescott (1997) ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 1600. As a mea-
sure of aggregate activity we choose output per worker. We observe that both vacancies
and unemployment are very volatile and very persistent. Vacancies are pro-cyclical, but
the unemployment rate is counter-cyclical. The average real wage rate is less volatile
than output per worker. In addition, we analyze whether the model is able to replicate
the pattern of a relative stable total separation rate (Hall, 2005), which is due to the
oﬀsetting behavior of its components (Nagypál, 2008). In particular, the employment-to-
unemployment (EU) transition rate is counter-cyclical, the employment-to-employment
(EE) transition rate is pro-cyclical, and the employment to out-of-the labor force (EO)
transition rate is essentially a-cyclical. Furthermore, Nagypál (2008) estimates that 50 to
60% of the volatility in the unemployment rate is due to composition changes in the total
separation rate. The remaining share is caused by variations in the job ﬁnding rate.
As demonstrated by Shimer (2005), the baseline job matching model without on-the-
job search is not able to replicate this pattern. The average real wage moves almost
one-to-one with output per worker, providing ﬁrms not enough incentives to amplify the
supply of vacancies over the business cycle. Hence, the model is not able to match the
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high degree of labor market volatility found in the data (Table 2.2b). Moreover, we note
that all model generated time series closely follow the exogenous stochastic process. This
result suggests that the internal propagation mechanism of the matching model without
physical capital is very weak. Besides, due to the exogenous separation margin, we observe
that the model generated ﬂow from employment to unemployment is, by construction,
pro-cyclical (Davis, 2006). This implies that the baseline job matching model is not able
to account for the composition changes in the total separation rate. Instead, all variation
in the aggregate unemployment rate is attributed to the job creation margin.
Table 2.2c presents the second moments of our calibrated model. We observe that the
inclusion of variable on-the-job search increases the volatility of vacancies and unemploy-
ment signiﬁcantly. Compared to the baseline model, the volatility of unemployment rises
by more than an order of a magnitude. This enormous rise is due to the counter-cyclical
variations in the endogenous separation margin. Figure (2.3) illustrates that recessions
involve a spike in the number of job separations. The unemployment rate tracks these
movements almost exactly. On the other hand, the volatility of vacancies rises only mod-
estly when variable on-the-job search is introduced. This result suggests that our model
generates most of the volatility in unemployment along the job separation margin, and
only little along the job creation margin.
This is a well-known problem in job matching models with endogenous separations
(Mortensen and Nagypál, 2008), where counter-cyclical ﬂuctuations in the job separation
margin may induce strong counter-cyclical movements in the number of unemployed job
searchers. Without on-the-job search, when aggregate search eﬀort is directly linked
to the number of unemployed job searchers, these movements stimulate ﬁrms to open
more vacancies when aggregate productivity is low. In other words, the model generated
Beveridge curve is positively sloped. This is in stark contrast to the data. Our model,
however, uncouples total search eﬀort from the number of unemployed job searchers.
Since on-the-job search is pro-cyclical, aggregate search eﬀort is relatively stable over the
business cycle. Hence, consistent with the data, we observe that ﬁrms post more vacancies
when aggregate productivity is high. Yet, the degree of ampliﬁcation remains below the
empirical estimate.
The main reason for the low volatility of vacancies is the fact that on-the-job search in-
volves job oﬀer rejections (Figure 2.2f). Firms suﬀer from job oﬀer rejections by employed
job searchers who prefer to stay in their old jobs. Each job oﬀer rejection implies that the
sunk cost of labor market search is lost. This eﬀect discourages ﬁrms to open vacancies.
Nevertheless, our model is able to generate a pro-cyclical time path of vacancies. This
partial success is due to the impact of two eﬀects. First, we observe that only employed
job searchers in low productivity matches make great eﬀorts to ﬁnd a new employment
opportunity. These workers try to “escape” imminent unemployment and, therefore, tend
to accept most of the job oﬀers. Second, conditional on job oﬀer acceptance, ﬁrms en-
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joy a higher expected payoﬀ from an employed job searcher than from an unemployed.
This is due to the fact that employed job searchers accept only attractive job oﬀers and,
therefore, are unlikely to quit later on. Hence, their expected match duration is longer
(Nagypál, 2007).
Figure (2.4) presents the cyclical behavior of the total job separation rate and its
components. The total job separation rate, represented by a yellow line, is made up of (i)
the sum of the exogenous and the endogenous separation rate, represented by a pink line,
and (ii) the employment-to-employment transition rate, represented by a blue line. The
graph shows that the two main components of the total job separation rate are negatively
correlated. The employment-to-employment transition rate is pro-cyclical, while the sum
of the exogenous and the endogenous separation rate is counter-cyclical. The total job
separation rate clearly exhibits less variability than its two main components.
Finally, we recall that our model is able to distinguish between the average real wage
rate the real wage rate of an individual worker.10 The average real wage rate is clearly less
volatile than the real wage rate of an individual worker. The co-movement with output,
however, is almost the same between both variables.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper addresses the large degree of frictional wage dispersion found in US data.
Hornstein et al. (2007) demonstrate that the average wage paid to observably identical
workers is about 70% higher than the lowest wage in the sample. The standard job
matching model without on-the-job search cannot replicate this pattern. With on-the-job
search, however, unemployed job searchers are more willing to accept low wage oﬀers
since they can continue to seek for better employment opportunities. This explains why
observably identical workers may be paid very diﬀerent wages. Therefore, we examine the
quantitative implications of variable on-the-job search (Nagypál, 2005) in a stochastic job
matching model (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994).
Our key result is that the inclusion of variable on-the-job search increases the degree of
frictional wage dispersion by an order of a magnitude (from about 3% to 40%). Variable
on-the-job search allows us to replicate the fact that search eﬀort is most intense among
workers in low-paid matches close to the separation margin (Fallick and Fleischman, 2004;
Christensen et al., 2005). These “marginal” workers try to escape imminent unemploy-
ment and tend to accept most of the job oﬀers (Nagypál, 2007). Hence, marginal workers
enjoy very high employment-to-employment transition rates. These high career expec-
tations stimulate unemployed job searchers to accept such low-paid matches. For this
reason, we observe that the average wage paid to ex-ante identical workers in our model
10The analyzed individual real wage corresponds to an employed worker with idiosyncratic productivity
level a = 1.1 who stays permanently on the same job.
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is about 40% higher than the lowest wage in the sample.
Furthermore, we evaluate our modiﬁed job matching model at the business cycle fre-
quencies. We observe that counter-cyclical variations in the endogenous job separation
rate amplify the cyclical variations in the aggregate unemployment rate. Indeed, our
model uncouples aggregate search eﬀort from the number of unemployed job searchers.
Since on-the-job search is pro-cyclical, we note that total search eﬀort, i.e. the sum of
all eﬀort undertaken by employed and unemployed job searchers, is relatively stable over
the business cycle. This stimulates ﬁrms to open more vacancies when aggregate produc-
tivity is high. As a consequence, we are able to replicate a negatively sloped Beveridge
curve. This is an interesting result, given that models with endogenous separations, but
without on-the-job search, imply that aggregate search eﬀort is strongly counter-cyclical
(Mortensen and Nagypál, 2008). Thus, in stark contrast to the data, ﬁrms are likely to
post more vacancies when the number of unemployed job searchers is high.
It would be interesting to extend our analysis to a more general wage bargaining set up.
To our knowledge, there is no study investigating all aspects of a multi-player bargaining
game under variable on-the-job search. Cahuc et al. (2006) examine the implications of a
multi-player bargaining game, where the search intensity of employed job searchers is con-
stant (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). They demonstrate that between-ﬁrm competition
increases the average wage rate if employed job searchers can resume their old positions.
Papp (2009) examines the implications of this approach in a general equilibrium model.
On the other hand, Shimer (2006) analyzes a strategic bargaining game between an em-
ployed job searcher and a single ﬁrm, where the ﬁrm is willing to oﬀer a higher wage rate
in order to reduce the extent of transitions to other employers.
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Appendix 2.A Tables
Parameter Description Value Source
U unemployment rate 0.10 Jones and Riddell (1999)
˜ f job ﬁnding rate 0.27 Hall (2005)
ρx EU transition rate 0.01 Hall (2005)
ρn EO transition rate 0.03 Hall (2005)
τ EE transition rate 0.04 Hall (2005)
b unemployment beneﬁts 0.85 Costain and Reiter (2008)
ξ ﬁrm’s bargaining power 0.25 Yashiv (2000)
κ vacancy posting cost 0.06 Yashiv (2000)
χ matching function constant 0.45 normalization
γ matching elasticity of vacancies 0.50 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
Z number of productivity states 29
m grid width 3 Tauchen (1986)
̺ 1st order autocorrelation 0.97 Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)11
σǫ standard deviation 0.007 Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)
Table 2.1: Calibrated Parameter Values
Y V U V/U W
σ(X) 0.01 0.13 0.11 0.24 0.01
σ(X)/σ(Y/N) 1 14.1 12.0 25.5 0.72
ρ(X,Y/N) 1 0.54 -0.42 0.49 0.38
ρ(Xt,Xt−1) 0.71 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.70
(a) US Business Cycle Facts
Y V U V/U W
σ(X) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02
σ(X)/σ(Y/N) 1 1.2 0.4 1.6 1
ρ(X,Y/N) 1 1 -0.95 1 0.84
ρ(Xt,Xt−1) 0.78 0.75 0.80 0.78 0.70
(b) Second Moments without On-the-job Search
Y V U V/U W Wi
σ(X) 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.01
σ(X)/σ(Y/N) 1 2.9 4.4 7.3 0.54 0.92
ρ(X,Y/N) 1 1 -0.99 0.99 0.97 1
ρ(Xt,Xt−1) 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.77
(c) Second Moments with On-the-job Search
Table 2.2: US Business Cycle Facts and the Corresponding Moments of our Model Economy. All Data
are logged and de-trended with an HP-Filter 1600. All US data (but the real wage) are taken directly
from OECD.Stat. The real wage is constructed using the time series “Compensation of Employees: Wages
and Salary Accruals” and “Total Nonfarm Payrolls: All Employees”.
11See Footnote (7)
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Appendix 2.B Figures
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Figure 2.1: Endogenous Distribution, the Real Wage Rate, and On-the-job Search
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Figure 2.2: Aggregate Labor Market Dynamics
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Figure 2.3: Counter-cyclical Spikes in the Separation Rate




















EE transitions EU transition all transitions
Figure 2.4: Composition Changes in the Total Separation Rate
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Chapter 3




This paper introduces staggered right-to-manage wage bargaining into a New Keynesian
business cycle model. Our key result is that a reasonably calibrated version of the model
is able to generate persistent responses in output, inﬂation, and total labor input to both
neutral technology and monetary policy shocks. Furthermore, we compare the model’s
dynamic behavior when calibrated to the US and to a European economy. We ﬁnd that
the degree of price rigidity explains most of the diﬀerences in response to a monetary
policy shock. Diﬀerences in the degree of wage rigidity, instead, alter the dynamics of the
model economy only by little. When the economy is hit by a neutral technology shock,
both price and wage rigidities turn out to be important. Apart from that, our results
indicate that matching frictions matter primarily for the dynamics of the labor market.
We introduce frictional labor markets into a New Keynesian business cycle model
akin to Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003). Households’ preferences
are represented by an additive utility function over consumption, working time, and real
money holdings. The composite consumption good consists of a CES aggregate of diﬀer-
entiated intermediate goods. These goods are produced by monopolistically competitive
intermediate good ﬁrms, facing Calvo (1983) type restrictions in price setting on the
product market. Factor markets for capital and labor services, instead, are assumed to be
perfectly competitive. Households accumulate physical capital and rent capital services
at a variable utilization rate to the intermediate good ﬁrms. Labor services are provided
by hiring ﬁrms searching for workers on frictional labor markets (Christoﬀel and Kuester,
2008). Upon matching, ﬁrm-worker pairs ﬁrst bargain over the real wage rate which is
subject to staggered wage contracts. In the second step, hiring ﬁrms may choose the
number of hours per worker unilaterally. In this setting, which is referred to as “right-to-
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manage” wage bargaining (Trigari, 2006), the real wage rate is allocative for the number
of hours per worker. Consequently, any rigidity in the real wage rate is transmitted via
the New Keynesian Phillips Curve into persistent movements of inﬂation. This feature of
right-to-manage wage bargaining is referred to as the “wage channel”.
We then examine the eﬀects of two structural shocks. The ﬁrst shock represents a
sudden increase in the short term nominal interest rate. Using diﬀerent identiﬁcation
strategies and data sets, Sims (1992), Leeper et al. (1996), and Christiano et al. (1999,
2005), among others, demonstrate that such a shock leads to distinct U-shaped responses
in both output and inﬂation. Moreover, Ravn and Simonelli (2008) show that also the
dynamic time path of total labor input follows a U-shaped pattern in the aftermath of a
monetary policy shock.
Second, we examine the impact of a neutral technology shock. Evidence on the eﬀects
of technology shocks is rather controversial. As shown by Galí (1999), a positive technol-
ogy shock generates a persistent rise in output and a persistent decline in the inﬂation
rate. In addition to that, he ﬁnds a negative correlation between technology and total
labor input. The latter observation is in stark contrast to the predictions of the baseline
RBC model and, thus, has sparked an intense and still ongoing debate in the literature.
While Francis and Ramey (2005) provide evidence in favor of his result, Christiano et al.
(2003, 2004) and Uhlig (2004) question its robustness.1 The study by Ravn and Simonelli
(2008) estimates a SVAR model of the US labor market which includes 4 diﬀerent shocks:
A neutral technology shock, an investment speciﬁc technology shock, a monetary policy
shock, and a government spending shock. They argue that the large set of identiﬁed
shocks minimizes the problem of mis-speciﬁcation and, therefore, yields more robust re-
sults. Their ﬁndings conﬁrm the conventional wisdom that a neutral technology shock
leads to a positive and hump-shaped response in output and a negative and U-shaped
response in inﬂation. Furthermore, they provide robust evidence that (i) output and
total labor input are positively correlated at the business cycle frequencies in response
to a neutral technology shock and that (ii) the impact response of the employment level
is positive. The impact response of total labor input, however, depends on the question
whether hours per worker are level or diﬀerence stationary.2
When we calibrate the model to the US economy, we observe that it is able to generate
persistent output responses to monetary policy shocks. This seems to be the main con-
tribution of our paper. New Keynesian models with Nash bargaining (e.g. Walsh, 2005),
instead, are not able to replicate this pattern once capital accumulation is introduced
(Heer and Maussner, 2007). This eﬀect is due to the alternative bargaining approach.
1As pointed out by Peersman and Straub (2005) and Heer and Maussner (2007), the impact of tech-
nology on total labor input depends crucially on the question whether hours per worker are level or
diﬀerence stationary.
2Their results are broadly consistent with the estimates of Braun et al. (2006), who use an alternative
identiﬁcation strategy.
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Right-to-manage wage bargaining establishes a direct link between the real wage rate
and real marginal costs. Hence, any rigidity in the average real wage rate dampens the
response in real marginal costs. This so-called “wage channel” has two important impli-
cations. First, the reduced elasticity of real marginal costs is transmitted via the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve into persistent movements of inﬂation. Second, we note that
the sluggish response in real marginal costs dampens additionally the response of the real
interest rate. In the case of variable capital utilization, this leads to a hump-shaped de-
cline in the input of capital services. Consequently, given that matching frictions induce
a sluggish response in total labor input, we note that the response of aggregate output
reaches its minimum not impact, but just in the second period after an innovation in
monetary policy.
In response to a neutral technology shock, our model is able to replicate a hump-
shaped response in output and a U-shaped response in inﬂation. Turning to the labor
market, we observe that unemployment exhibits a negative impact response and then
continues to decrease for about 6 quarters. Hours per worker, instead, fall on impact, but
then rise for about 2 years before eventually falling. Hence, consistent with the ﬁndings
of Ravn and Simonelli (2008), we observe a positive correlation between output and total
labor input at the business cycle frequencies in response to a neutral technology shock.
Apart from that, we calibrate our model to a European economy and compare its
dynamic behavior with the US model economy. The European model economy diﬀers
in terms of a greater price rigidity parameter, a greater real wage rigidity parameter,
and a larger degree of matching frictions in the labor market. In particular, we account
for the fact that European transition rates between employment and unemployment are
considerably lower. The higher value of the average European unemployment rate is
mainly due to a more generous replacement ratio.
In response to a monetary policy shock, we observe that the decline in output and total
labor input is larger and more protracted in the European model economy. The impulse
response of inﬂation, however, shows a smaller impact response and a more persistent
adjustment path. These three observations can be attributed to the greater price rigidity
parameter. Further, the impulse response of the European unemployment rate exhibits
a clear hump-shape. In the US model economy, on the contrary, the unemployment rate
spikes on impact and then converges quickly to its steady state value. This pattern is
mainly explained by the smaller value of the job separation rate which delays labor market
turnover.
When the two model economies are hit by a neutral technology shock, we observe
more interdependencies between the three frictions considered. On the one hand, the
larger degree of price rigidity raises the amplitude of output and inﬂation. On the other
hand, the larger degree of real wage rigidity dampens the amplitude and delays the speed
of convergence. In total, the amplitude of both impulse responses remains almost con-
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stant, but convergence is slower under the European calibration. Again, the labor market
calibration aﬀects primarily the response of the unemployment rate. First, we note that
the percentage impact response of the European unemployment rate is only about 1/4
of the US value. Second, in the same way as above, greater price rigidity increases the
amplitude of the unemployment rate, while a large degree of real wage rigidity dampens
the ﬂuctuations. As a result, the joint impact of the two Calvo type rigidities raises the
persistence of the unemployment rate, but leave its amplitude virtually unchanged.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model
environment. Section 3.3 calibrates the model and evaluates its quantitative performance.
We investigate the mechanism of the right-to-manage bargaining model based on a cali-
bration to the US economy. In addition, we examine the diﬀerences between the US and
a European model economy. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 The Model Environment
3.2.1 Labor Market Frictions
Labor market frictions are represented by a Cobb-Douglas matching function that relates
aggregate job matches Mt to the number of vacancies that are posted by the ﬁrms Vt and





t−1 ≤ min[Vt,Ut−1]. (3.1)
The ratio between vacancies and unemployed job searchers (Vt/Ut−1 = θt) measures
the tightness of the labor market. By linear homogeneity of the matching function, the


















The tighter the labor market, the longer the expected time to ﬁll a vacancy, but
the shorter the expected search for a job (and vice versa). The fact that ﬁrms and
households do not internalize these adverse eﬀects on the aggregate return rates gives rise
to congestion externalities.
At the end of each period, new job matches are formed and a fraction of pre-existing
jobs is terminated. Consistent with the results of Shimer (2007), we assume a constant
job destruction rate ρ. Hence, the law of motion for the aggregate level of employment is
3We follow the textbook job matching model (Pissarides, 1985, 2000) that abstracts from movements
into and out of the labor force. Hence, Ut = 1 − Nt holds.
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given by:
Nt = (1 − ρ)Nt−1 + Mt. (3.3)
Moreover, we assume that the real wage rate is subject to staggered wage contracts
(Calvo, 1983). This implies that — new and ongoing — ﬁrm-worker pairs are able to
bargain over the real wage rate w∗
t only with probability (1 − ωw). Otherwise, the real
wage rate in ongoing ﬁrm-worker pairs remains constant. New ﬁrm-worker pairs that
are unable to negotiate simply adopt the average real wage rate of the previous period
wt−1.4 Hence, the evolution of the average real wage rate wt is governed by following law
of motion:




There is a large number of households, each of which consists of a continuum of individuals.
Household members derive utility from the composite consumption good Cj,t and real
money holdings (M/P)j,t. Employed household members additionally suﬀer disutility



















where ψc measures the degree of habit persistence in consumption and 1/σf denotes the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in the supply of hours worked.
Employed and unemployed household members insure each other completely against
idiosyncratic income risk from unemployment (Merz, 1995; Andolfatto, 1996). Thus, the
budget constraint of the representative household can be written as:
Ct + It + (M/P)t + Bt + a(xt)¯ kt−1 =
  Nt−1
0







Bt−1 − Tt. (3.6)
Employed household members earn the real wage rate wj,t per working hour hj,t, while
unemployed household members Ut−1 receive unemployment beneﬁts b. The lump-sum
transfer Tt imposed by the government ﬁnances unemployment beneﬁts, governmental
consumption, and rebates any seigniorage revenue to the households (see section 3.2.6).
Government bonds Bt pay a nominal interest rate Rt in period t+1. Moreover, households
4As demonstrated by Haefke et al. (2009) and Pissarides (2009), wages in new hires are signiﬁcantly
more volatile than wages in incumbent matches. Under right-to-manage wage bargaining, however,
accounting for this aspect hardy changes the quantitative results (Christoﬀel et al., 2009). For this
reason, we choose the described set-up for analytical convenience.
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receive lump-sum dividends5 Πt remitted by ﬁrms and capital income rtKt. Eﬀective
capital services Kt are given by the physical capital stock ¯ Kt−1 times the capital utilization
rate xt. Following (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004), the costs of variations in the degree





2 + χb(xt − 1). (3.7)
Hence, provided that the steady state value of capital utilization is normalized to
unity, the steady state of the model economy will be independent of a(xt), i.e. a(1) = 0.
Nevertheless, capital adjustment costs aﬀect the utilization elasticity with respect to the
rental rate of capital: [a′(x)/(a′′(x) x)]|x=1 = χb/χa.
Furthermore, the law of motion for the physical capital stock is given by:
















is restricted to satisfy S(1) = S′(1) = 0 and S′′(1) = χs > 0. The law of motion for the
household’s employment share reads as follows:
Nt = (1 − ρ)Nt−1 + qtθtUt−1. (3.10)
First Order Conditions
Provided stochastic time paths for
 
Rt,rt,Πt,πt,θt,Tt,˜ ht| ≥ 0
 
, and a set of initial con-
ditions for the state variables
 
¯ K0,N0, ˜ w0
 
, the representative household chooses contin-
gency plans
 
Ct,xt,Bt,Mt,It, ¯ Kt|t ≥ 0
 
that maximize its expected discounted utility:6
Ut
 





U(Ct,(M/P)t,˜ ht) + βUt+1( ¯ Kt,Nt, ˜ wt+1)
 
(3.11)
5Aggregate dividends Πt = Πy +Πn are given as the sum of dividends remitted by intermediate good
ﬁrms and hiring ﬁrms, respectively.
6The distribution of real wages and hours over matched ﬁrm-worker pairs is denoted by ˜ wt and ˜ ht,
respectively.
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These choices have to satisfy following ﬁrst order conditions:






































































(Qt+1(1 − δ) − a(xt+1) + rt+1xt+1)
 
. (3.17)
The ﬁrst order conditions describe the marginal utility of consumption (3.12), the
relation between the rental rate of capital r and the utilization rate xt (3.13), the Euler
equation for government bonds (3.14), the demand for real money holdings (3.15), optimal
investment (3.16), and the real value of physical capital (3.17).
The Net Beneﬁt of Additional Employment
The net marginal beneﬁt to the household when an unemployed household member ﬁnds















j,t /1 + σf
 
(3.18)
+ωwβEt [(1 − ρ)W(wj,t) − q(θt)θtW(wt)]







One additional employed household member increases the net income of the household,
but suﬀers disutility from working time. Besides that, the household gains the continua-
tion value of the current real wage rate W(wj,t) with probability (1−ρ)ωw, the continuation
value of the re-negotiated real wage rate W(w∗
j,t+1) with probability (1−ρ)(1−ωw), and
loses the continuation value of unemployment. The latter is determined by the job ﬁnding
rate q(θt)θt, the expected value of a job that pays the average real wage rate W(wt), and
the expected value of a job that pays the re-negotiated real wage rate W(w∗
j,t+1).
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3.2.3 The Composite Consumption Good
The composite consumption good consists of a CES aggregate of diﬀerentiated interme-
diate goods:
Ct =







where ξp > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated intermediate goods
Cit. Given that Pit denotes the price for intermediate good i, equation (3.19) implies that








Integrating (3.20) and imposing (3.19), we obtain the associated minimum expenditure
price index:
Pt =







3.2.4 Intermediate Good Firms
Each intermediate good i ∈ [0,1] is produced by a single ﬁrm and sold in a market
characterized by monopolistic competition.7 The productive process in this sector can be
described by a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale:








t represents total factor productivity subject to an exogenous shock speciﬁed by












Following de Walque et al. (2008), we assume perfect competition on the factor mar-
kets. Intermediate good ﬁrms rent capital services Kt directly from the households and
labor services Lt from hiring ﬁrms. Constant returns to scale in production in combi-
nation with price-taking behavior on the factor markets yield following factor prices for
capital (rt) and labor services (Wt), respectively:
rt = λy,tY1(Kt,Lt), (3.24)
Wt = λy,tY2(Kt,Lt). (3.25)











7Given symmetry, we will drop the subscript i in the following.
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On the product market, intermediate good ﬁrms face Calvo (1983) type restrictions
in price setting. In the beginning of period t, only a fraction 1−ωp of intermediate good
ﬁrms is able to re-optimize the price of its variety. Intermediate good ﬁrms that cannot
re-optimize simply index their prices to lagged inﬂation πt−1. This speciﬁcation yields











(1 − ωp)(1 − βωp)




Labor services are provided by specialized hiring ﬁrms (Christoﬀel and Kuester, 2008).
There is a continuum of potential hiring ﬁrms on the unit interval. Each hiring ﬁrm can
hire at most one worker j. Hiring ﬁrms with ﬁlled positions Nt−1 produce labor services
according to a decreasing returns to scale technology H(hj,t) = h
σh
j,t, with σh < 1. Hence,
the units of aggregate labor services Lt produced in period t are given by:









The hiring ﬁrm j rents the amount H(hj,t) of labor services to intermediate good ﬁrms
at rate Wt on a competitive market. The worker receives the real wage rate wj,t per hour
worked hj,t.
If the match survives exogenous job destruction at the end of period t, the ﬁrm and
the worker may re-negotiate the real wage rate with probability (1 − ωw) in period t + 1.
Otherwise, the real wage rate remains constant. Hence, the value of a ﬁlled position to
the hiring ﬁrm reads as:












Hiring ﬁrms with unﬁlled positions may decide whether or not to open a vacancy.
Posting a vacancy entails a cost κ per period. Therefore, the hiring ﬁrm can expect to
gain the value of a ﬁlled position Jt+1 with probability q(θt) in the next period. With
probability 1 − q(θt) the vacancy remains unﬁlled. Upon matching, the ﬁrm-worker pair
j will be able to bargain over the real wage rate w∗
t+1 with probability (1 − ωw). If the
hiring ﬁrm and the worker are unable to bargain, they will adopt the average real wage
rate of the previous period, i.e. wt. Thus, the value of an unﬁlled vacancy Vt is given as:







ωwJt+1(wt) + (1 − ωw)Jt+1(w∗
t+1)
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Free entry into the matching market ensures that the hiring ﬁrm’s outside option,
i.e. the value of an unﬁlled vacancy, is zero in each period: Vt = 0 ∀ t. Hence, the














Right-to-manage wage bargaining (Trigari, 2006), in contrast, presumes following sequen-
tial setting: First, both parties agree on a real wage rate wt according to the Nash rule.
Second, the hiring ﬁrm may choose the number of hours per worker hj,t unilaterally. Thus,












The ﬁrst order condition (3.32) states that hiring ﬁrms set hours per worker such
that the real wage rate equals the marginal product per hour worked. Provided that σh is
close to one, this implies that movements in the average real wage rate wt translate almost
one-to-one into changes in the competitive price of labor services Wt and, thus, into real
marginal costs λy,t. This feature of the right-to-manage bargaining model is referred to
as the “wage channel”.
Furthermore, equation (3.33) points out that hours per worker under right-to-manage
are a function of the real wage rate. During the wage bargaining, both parties inter-
nalize the impact of the real wage rate on the number of hours per worker. Hence, the





















where 0 < η < 1 denotes the relative (“nominal”) bargaining power of the household.
The net marginal beneﬁt of an increase in the real wage rate to the worker, and the loss
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Thus, using equations (3.18), (3.25), (3.28), (3.29), and (3.34) the steady-state wage



















where the eﬀective bargaining weight η∗







t + (1 − η)δF
t
. (3.38)
3.2.6 Government and Monetary Authority
The government ﬁnances unemployment beneﬁts b, issues bonds Bt that pay a nominal
interest rate Rt in period t + 1, and consumes a constant share of output Gt = gYt. Any
seigniorage revenue is rebated to the households. Each period, the budget balance is
maintained by imposing a lump-sum tax Tt:































8We have multiplied both expressions with the re-negotiated real wage rate w∗
t.
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where ǫr
t is a serially uncorrelated, mean zero stochastic process and φπ > 1. Accordingly,
the monetary authority sets the short-term nominal interest rate depending on the lagged
nominal interest rate Rt−1, current inﬂation πt, and the current level of economic activity
Yt (Clarida et al., 2000).
3.2.7 Market Clearing
The model economy is closed by the resource constraint. It postulates that output is
divided into private consumption, investment, government consumption, vacancy posting
costs, and capital utilization costs.
Yt = Ct + It + Gt + κVt + a(xt)¯ kt−1. (3.41)
3.3 Model Evaluation
3.3.1 Calibration US
We analyze the cyclical behavior of the log-linearized model economy around the non-
stochastic steady state. The parameters are chosen to be largely consistent with those
standard in the literature. The time period of the model corresponds to one quarter.
Preferences The discount factor β is chosen to match an annual real interest rate of
4 percent (Kydland and Prescott, 1982). Following Christiano et al. (2005), we assume
logarithmic preferences in consumption (σc = 1), together with external habit formation
(ψc = 0.65). In addition, we borrow their estimates for the interest semi-elasticity of
money demand (0.96, implying σq = 6.3) and the elasticity of substitution between diﬀer-
entiated intermediate goods (ξp = 6). The latter value implies that the average mark-up
((1/λy) − 1) is equal to 20%. For the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply (1/σf) we
target a value that lies within the range [0.3 – 0.7] estimated by MaCurdy (1983).
Production and the Capital Market The monthly depreciation rate δ is set to match
an annual rate of 10% (Kydland and Prescott, 1982). In addition, we adopt following two
parameters from Christiano et al. (2005): First, we set α = 0.36 which corresponds to a
steady state labor share slightly below 64%.9 Second, the scaling parameter of the invest-
ment adjustment cost function (χs = 2) is chosen such that the elasticity of investment
with respect to a one percent temporary increase in the current price of installed capital
is equal to 0.4. Our chosen value for the elasticity of capital utilization with respect to the
rental rate of capital (χb/χa) = 1 is close to the estimate by Smets and Wouters (2007).
9In labor search models the labor share is slightly lower than the production elasticity of labor.
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Matching and the Labor Market Following Shimer (2005), we target an average
unemployment rate U = 5.7% and a steady state job ﬁnding rate q(θ)θ = 83.4%. This
requires setting the job destruction rate ρ equal to 5% (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1990).
Moreover, we assume that unemployment beneﬁts b = repb W as well as the steady state







= reph W = reph λy(1 − α)(Y/N), (3.42)
can be quantiﬁed as percentage of the competitive price of labor services W. This allows
us to derive an expression which we can solve for the steady state (un)employment rate
in closed form. Therefore, we plug the vacancy ﬁlling rate (3.31), the steady state job




[(1 − η∗)(1 − α)(1 − (repb + reph))λyY ] − [(κV/βρ)(1 − β(1 − ρ))]
η∗κV
(3.43)
We parameterize equation (3.43) as follows: Eﬀective bargaining power is assumed
to be symmetrically distributed, i.e. η∗ = 0.5 (Svejnar, 1986). Unemployment ben-
eﬁts repb = 0.36 are calibrated using OECD (2006, p. 60) data on the net replace-
ment rate. Average vacancy posting costs are set to the standard value of κV = 1%
(Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996, p. 1278). Output Y is normalized to unity. Given these
values, we have to set reph = 28.5% in order to replicate an average unemployment rate
U = 5.7%. Thus, the total replacement ratio is equal to repb + reph = 64.5%. Our cali-
bration implies that the semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect to the replacement
rate is equal to 3. This value lies within the range of estimates by Costain and Reiter
(2008).10
The matching elasticity of vacancies (  = 0.5) does not aﬀect the steady state of the
model economy, but its cyclical behavior. We set   = 0.5, which is within the interval
[0.3,0.5] proposed by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). Moreover, our choice (  = η∗)
satisﬁes the Hosios (1990) condition. Finally, we set the steady state vacancy ﬁlling rate
q(θ) to 0.7 (van Ours and Ridder, 1992).11
Right-to-Manage Bargaining Given that average working time h is normalized to
unity (Trigari, 2006), we can derive an expression for labor eﬃciency σh, using the com-
petitive price of labor services (3.25), the value of a job to the ﬁrm (3.29), the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst
10As a further robustness check, we reduce unemployment beneﬁts by 10 percentage points. This
implies that the steady state unemployment rate falls by 1.3 percentage points, which is in line with the
results of Bassanini and Duval (2006).
11As demonstrated by Shimer (2005), the model allows for the normalization of the vacancy ﬁlling rate.
Nevertheless, we choose a meaningful value.
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order condition for hours per worker (3.32), and the job creation condition (3.31):
σh = 0.9775 = 1 −
(κV/ρβ)(1 − β(1 − ρ))
λy(1 − α)H(h)
. (3.44)
This value is close to constant returns to scale (Christoﬀel and Kuester, 2008). We
then assume that worker’s “nominal” and eﬀective bargaining power are equal in the
steady state, i.e. η = η∗ = 0.5. This implies that, in the steady state, the net marginal
beneﬁt of an increase in the real wage rate to the worker (δW) equals the net marginal
loss to the hiring ﬁrm (δF). According to equations (3.35) and (3.36), this condition holds
if the real wage rate w equals the marginal rate of substitution. This requires setting
σh = 2.43, a value that is consistent with the results of MaCurdy (1983).
Government and Monetary Policy We calibrate the share of governmental con-
sumption in total output g to 18% (Smets and Wouters, 2007), which implies an average
consumption share (C/Y ) of about 56%. The ratio of nominal output P Y to the mone-
tary aggregate M, i.e. the velocity of money, is set to 0.36 (Christiano et al., 2005). The
values chosen for the generalized Taylor rule (φr = 0.8,φπ = 2.0,φy = 0.3) are taken from
Gertler et al. (2008).
Price and Wage Rigidities We adopt the Calvo (1983) price (ωp = 0.60) and wage
(ωw = 0.65) rigidity parameters estimated by Christiano et al. (2005).
Stochastic Processes We calibrate the law of motion for the technology shock using
the conventional values (ρz = 0.95,ιz = 0.007) suggested by Cooley and Prescott (1995).
The standard deviation of the monetary policy shock (ιm = 0.002) is taken from Walsh
(2005).
3.3.2 Calibration France
Our analysis focuses on the impact of staggered prices, staggered wages, and the size
of labor market ﬂows. Hence, in order to facilitate comparability with the US model
economy, we only alter the respective parameters (Table 3.2). Following Álvarez et al.
(2006), we set the degree of price rigidity ωF
p = 0.75. The parameter governing the
degree of wage rigidity (ωF
w = 0.83) is chosen in accordance with du Caju et al. (2008).
Furthermore, we target the average French unemployment rate between 1978:2007, i.e.
UF = 9.0% (OECD, 2008b). Given that the French job ﬁnding rate exhibits almost
no duration dependence (Hobijn and Sahin, 2007; Elsby et al., 2009), we approximate
the steady-state job ﬁnding rate (qF(θF)θF = 21.3%) by the average fraction of workers
unemployed for less than three months (OECD, 2008a). These values imply an average job
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separation rate equal to ρF = 2.36%.12 The amount of French unemployment beneﬁts is
calibrated to repF
b = 0.57 (OECD, 2006). We then set the leisure gain from unemployment
repF
l = 0.188 in order to match the average French unemployment rate (Equation 3.43).
Finally, we choose σF
f = 4.19, such that η∗ = η holds. The implied value of labor eﬃciency
(σF
h = 0.9723, Equation 3.44) remains almost unchanged.
3.3.3 Inspecting the Mechanism of Staggered Wage Contracts
This section examines the dynamic behavior of a New Keynesian business cycle model
with right-to-manage wage bargaining. Our computations are performed using Dynare
4.0.2 (Juillard, 1996). Table (3.1) presents the impulse responses of the US model econ-
omy to an innovation in monetary policy, given diﬀerent values of the real wage rigidity
parameter (ωw = {0.00,0.01, 0.65,0.83}). Table (3.2) repeats the same exercise for a
neutral technology shock. The graphs depict the evolution of the impulse responses over
32 quarters.
Impulse Responses to an Innovation in Monetary Policy The impulse responses
reveal that staggered wage contracts are an eﬀective means to reduce the elasticity of
the average real wage rate. Even if there is only a very small share of matches that are
unable to re-negotiate (ωw = 0.01), we observe a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the dynamic
behavior of the real wage rate compared to the fully ﬂexible wage regime (ωw = 0.00).
If we increase the wage rigidity parameter until it equals the value estimated for the US
economy (ωw = 0.60), the elasticity of the real wage rate decreases further. However, the
value estimated for France (ωw = 0.83) generates almost the same impulse response as
the US value.
Since labor eﬃciency σh is close to unity, the impulse responses of the average real wage
rate wt and of the competitive price of labor services Wt match each other almost exactly.
Moreover, Equation (3.26) shows that the competitive price of labor services feeds directly
into the determination of real marginal costs λy,t. Hence, any rigidity in the average real
wage rate is transmitted via the competitive price of labor services into the dynamic time
path of real marginal costs. This implies that real wage rigidity under right-to-manage
wage bargaining is able to reduce the elasticity of real marginal costs. The New Keynesian
Phillips Curve entails that these sluggish dynamics translate into persistent movements of
inﬂation. The direct link between real wage rigidity and inﬂation persistence established
by the right-to-manage bargaining model is known as the “wage channel” (Trigari, 2006).
Furthermore, we note that the model is not only capable to generate persistent re-
sponses in inﬂation, but also in output and total labor input. The so-called wage channel
established by the right-to-manage bargaining approach increases not only the persistence
12Our values are almost identical to the ones of Sigrist (2009), who estimates an average job ﬁnding
rate equal to 20.1% and an average job separation rate equal to 2.4% for France on a quarterly basis.
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of inﬂation, but dampens also the response of the real interest rate. In the case of variable
capital utilization, this implies that the input of capital services responds more sluggishly.
Consequently, given that matching frictions induce a lagged response in total labor input,
we note that the response of aggregate output reaches its minimum not impact, but just
in the second period after an innovation in monetary policy.
The mechanism behind staggered right-to-manage wage bargaining can be described as
follows. Firm j is able to set unilaterally the proﬁt maximizing number of hour per worker
hj,t, given the spread between the real wage wj,t paid in match j and the competitive price
of labor services Wt (Equation 3.33). Recall that the impulse responses of the average real
wage rate wt and of the competitive price of labor services Wt match each other almost
exactly. Hiring ﬁrms that are unable to re-negotiate, however, may be forced to pay a real
wage rate wj,t that is quite diﬀerent from the competitive price of labor services. Hence,
given that labor eﬃciency σh is close to unity, these ﬁrms tend to adjust the number of
hours per worker drastically.13
Following three impulse response functions illustrate the consequences of right-to-
manage wage bargaining: (i) the number of hours per worker associated with the average
real wage rate wt,14 (ii) the number of hours per worker associated with the re-negotiated
real wage rate w∗
t, and (iii) the number of hours per worker associated with the lagged
average real wage rate wt−1. In the case of fully ﬂexible real wages, the average real
wage rate and the re-negotiated real wage rate are identical, and so are the corresponding
impulse responses of hours per worker. Yet, even if there is only a very small share of
ﬁrms that is unable to re-negotiate (ωw = 0.01), we note that these ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal
to adjust the number of hours per worker to a large extent. In response to an innovation
in monetary policy, the impulse response of hours per worker associated with the lagged
average real wage rate h(wt−1) plummets on impact by more than 60% and then shoots
up sharply, peaking at approximately 40% above its steady-state value after 3 quarters.
Given that the average number of hours per worker h(wt) remains almost unchanged,
large movements in h(wt−1) imply a signiﬁcant change in the adjustment pattern of hours
per worker associated with the re-negotiated real wage rate h(w∗
t). In the case of fully
ﬂexible wages, the impulse response of h(w∗
t) shows a negative spike on impact and a
fast convergence to its steady-state value. But if only 1% of the wage contracts is not
re-negotiated in every period, the impulse response shows a clear hump-shape and a
considerably slower speed of convergence.
We emphasize this issue, since the impulse response of the number of hours per worker
associated with the re-negotiated real wage rate h(w∗
t) is of great importance for the
13This is a distinct feature of the right-to-manage bargaining model with staggered wage contracts.
Only if the number of hours per worker depends on the real wage rate, a dispersion of hours per worker
can emerge.
14In our ﬁrst order approximation, the number of hours per worker associated with the average real
wage rate is equal to the average number of hours per worker (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004).
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dynamics of the whole model economy. In particular, the movements in h(w∗
t) determine
the sign of the response of the eﬀective bargaining weight η∗
t. This implies that movements
in h(w∗
t) feed back into the re-negotiated real wage rate w∗
t. If wages are fully ﬂexible,
an innovation in monetary policy induces a fall in the eﬀective bargaining weight of the
household which accounts for approximately 2/3rd of the reduction in the re-negotiated
real wage rate w∗
t. With increasing real wage rigidity, instead, the bargaining weight of the
household raises on impact by 3% and, hence, stabilizes the re-negotiated real wage rate.
This explains why the impulse response of the re-negotiated real wage w∗
t rate matches
the impulse response of the average real wage rate wt almost exactly.
Impulse Responses to a Neutral Technology Shock This section analyzes the
eﬀects of a neutral technology shock on the dynamic behavior of the model economy.
Consistent with the results of Ravn and Simonelli (2008), Figure (3.2) shows that the
impact response of employment is positive, and then continues to rise until it reaches
a maximum after about 6 quarters.15 Real wage rigidity clearly ampliﬁes the response
of the employment level. Hours per worker, on the other hand, show a negative impact
response. In the following periods, however, the average number of hours per worker
rises dramatically and peaks after about 6 quarters. Comparing the elasticities of the
employment level and hours per worker, we note that ﬁrms adjust employment primarily
through the intensive margin. This prediction is not consistent with the data (see below).
For this reason, we observe that the responses of total labor input and hours per worker
are very similar. Total labor input remains below its steady-state value in the ﬁrst few
quarters after a neutral technology shock. As soon as prices adjust, intermediate good
ﬁrms expand output and tend to demand more labor services from the hiring ﬁrms.
Hence, total labor input follows a hump-shaped pattern. This implies that output and
total labor input are positively correlated at the business cycle frequencies in response
to a neutral technology shock (ρX,Y=0.95, see Table 3.3). Furthermore, the expansion
in aggregate output induces the monetary authority to raise the nominal interest rate.
Thus, we observe a pronounced U-shape in the impulse response of inﬂation.
Staggered wage contracts reduce the elasticity of the real wage in the same way as
in response to monetary policy shocks. But, in contrast to the last section, real wage
rigidity now increases the amplitude of the ﬂuctuations in the average number of hours
per worker. As a result, the elasticity of average labor costs wtht rises, the more rigid is
the real wage rate. This surprising outcome is due to the fact that hiring ﬁrms that are
unable to re-negotiate tend to increase the number of hours per worker hj,t enormously.
Hiring ﬁrms that are able to re-negotiate, instead, even decrease the number of hours per
worker h∗
t slightly.
15In our model, Nt = 1 − Ut holds (see Footnote 3). Hence, the responses of employment and unem-
ployment are symmetric.
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In order to study the consequences of right-to-manage wage bargaining for the dynam-
ics of the labor market, we recall that the incentive of a potential hiring ﬁrm to open a
new vacancy is provided by the discounted ﬂow of expected proﬁts. Moreover, as shown
by Christoﬀel and Kuester (2008), right-to-manage bargaining entails that the proﬁt ﬂow
of a hiring ﬁrm Πj,n is proportional to its labor costs wj,thj,t:
Πj,n(t) = WtH(hj,t) − wj,thj,t = ((1 − σh)/σh)wj,thj,t (3.45)
In other words, the model predicts that (un)employment ﬂuctuates stronger, the more
volatile are labor costs. For this reason, the introduction of real wage rigidity ampliﬁes
the volatility of the labor market variables. It does so, however, not because labor costs
are more rigid, but because labor costs are more volatile.
In addition to that, we note that real wage rigidity raises the elasticity of output by
a large extent. The increase in the elasticity of aggregate output is mainly driven by
adjustments in the average number of hours per worker. Since ﬁrms are able to adjust
the number of hours per worker unilaterally, they do so extensively. This explains why
right-to-manage bargaining model with staggered wage contracts is able to increase the
absolute volatility of the labor market, but not the relative movements of unemployment
with respect to aggregate output (see also Table 3.3). Hence, our model cannot replicate
the stylized the stylized business cycle fact that most of the variation in total labor input is
due to movements into and out of employment rather than to adjustments in the average
number of hours per worker (see Section 3.3.4).
This ﬁnding clearly contradicts previous work by Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005), which
suggests that real wage rigidity establishes an important ampliﬁcation mechanism for the
labor market. The opposing implications are driven by diﬀerences in the underlying bar-
gaining process. Under Nash bargaining, as assumed by Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005),
the real wage rate wt splits the mutual surplus, while hours per worker ht are set indepen-
dently of the actual real wage rate in order to maximize the mutual surplus. Maximization
of the mutual surplus requires that the marginal product of labor is equal to the marginal
rate of substitution (Cheron and Langot, 2004). This has three important implications.
First, as shown by Trigari (2006), the marginal rate of substitution is the main determi-
nant of the dynamics of real marginal costs — and not the real wage rate. Second, the
proﬁt ﬂow of hiring ﬁrms is not proportional to labor costs. Consequently, models with
Nash bargaining and real wage rigidity (Krause and Lubik, 2007) do not exhibit a “wage
channel”, but are capable to amplify the relative volatility of the labor market. Third,
the real wage rate is not allocative for hours per worker. Hence, the eﬀective bargaining
weight is constant and unable to absorb any shocks.
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3.3.4 A Transatlantic Perspective
This section examines the impact of country-speciﬁc frictions on the dynamic behavior of
the model economy. In particular, we focus on diﬀerences in the price rigidity parameter,
the wage rigidity parameter, and in the degree of matching frictions in the labor market.
In particular, we account for the fact that European transition rates between employment
and unemployment are considerably lower. The higher value of the average unemployment
rate is mainly due to a more generous replacement ratio. We then evaluate the model
calibrated to the US (Section 3.3.1) against the model calibrated to the French economy
(Section 3.3.2). In order to disentangle the eﬀects of these frictions, we additionally
evaluate two counter-factual model economies: (i) the model calibrated to France, but
with prices ﬂexible as in the US and (ii) the model calibrated to France, but with prices
and wages ﬂexible as in the US. The latter model exhibits the same Calvo type rigidity
parameters as the US model economy, but diﬀers in the calibration of the labor market.
Impulse Responses to an Innovation in Monetary Policy Table (3.3) shows that
the degree of price rigidity plays a dominant role in the determination of aggregate inﬂa-
tion. If prices change more frequently, the impulse response function is considerably more
elastic and immediate. The more ﬂexible response of US prices entails that aggregate
output falls by less and converges much faster to its steady state value. Quite surpris-
ingly, the higher degree of real wage rigidity in France has no signiﬁcant impact on the
responses of inﬂation and output. Furthermore, we observe that the impulse response of
the French unemployment rate exhibits a clear hump-shape. In the US model economy,
on the contrary, the unemployment rate spikes on impact and then converges quickly to
its steady state value. This pattern is mainly explained by the smaller value of the job
separation rate which delays labor market turnover.
In summary, the model indicates that the transmission of an innovation in monetary
policy to the economy is mainly determined by the degree of price rigidity. The degree of
real wage rigidity, in contrast, seems to be less important.16. In addition, we ﬁnd out that
central banks concerned about the stabilization of employment should closely monitor the
transition rates between the diﬀerent labor market states.
Impulse Responses to a Neutral Technology Shock When the two model econo-
mies are hit by a neutral technology shock (Table 3.4), we observe more interdependencies
between the three frictions considered. On the one hand, the larger degree of price rigidity
raises the amplitude of output and inﬂation. On the other hand, the larger degree of real
wage rigidity dampens the amplitude and delays the speed of convergence. In total, the
16Section (3.3.3) sheds some light upon this surprising result. The presence of real wage rigidity is
relevant for the transmission of monetary policy. However, the medium US value and the high French
value generate almost the same results
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amplitude of both impulse responses remains almost constant, but convergence is slower
under the French calibration. Again, the labor market calibration aﬀects primarily the
response of the unemployment rate. First, we note that the percentage impact response
of the French unemployment rate is only about 1/4 of the US value. Second, in the same
way as above, greater price rigidity increases the amplitude of the unemployment rate,
while a large degree of real wage rigidity dampens the ﬂuctuations. As a result, the joint
impact of the two Calvo type rigidities raises the persistence of the unemployment rate,
but leave its amplitude virtually unchanged.
Discussion of the Second Moments Table (3.3) illustrates the unconditional second
moments of the US economy, the French economy, and the conditional model generated
data. As is well known, US labor market ﬂuctuations are very volatile and persistent. The
US unemployment rate is about 7 times as volatile as output, vacancies even more. This
stylized fact has attracted much attention in the recent literature.17 Total labor input
is about as volatile as output. Most of its variability seems to be due to variations in
the stock of employment rather than the average number of hours per worker, conﬁrming
the ﬁndings of Cooley and Prescott (1995). The wage bill per worker is signiﬁcantly
less volatile than output. Besides, we observe that consumption is somewhat less volatile
than output, while investment ﬂuctuates more. Inﬂation exhibits signiﬁcantly less cyclical
variability than output, is counter-cyclical, and very persistent.
Quite surprisingly, we notice that the unconditional moments of the French economy
are fairly similar. The most interesting diﬀerences are the following. The volatility of
French output is only about 2/3 of the US value. This implies that the absolute volatility
of aggregate variables like unemployment, vacancies, investment or consumption is sig-
niﬁcantly lower than in the US, although the relative volatilities are very close to each
other. In addition, we note that, in France, co-movement between output and all vari-
ables considered is weaker. In particular, the wage bill per worker and its components are
essentially acyclical. Nevertheless, the wage bill per worker exhibits a considerable degree
of cyclical volatility.
The model presented is not designed to match these facts. The model was rather devel-
oped to replicate the qualitative pattern of the impulse response functions. Nevertheless,
the model is capable to replicate a positive correlation between output and total labor
input at the business cycle frequencies to a neutral technology shock (Ravn and Simonelli,
2008). Apart from that, the simulated data clearly point out along which lines the ﬁt
of the model is yet to be improved. Neither the neutral technology shock, nor the mon-
etary policy shock is able to explain the large cyclical volatility in the unemployment
rate. On the other hand, the model generates excess volatility in the number of hours
17Shimer (2005) stimulated a considerable discussion on how to match the high volatility found in the
data. The most prominent examples include staggered Nash bargaining (Gertler and Trigari, 2009) and
an alternative calibration procedure (Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008).
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per worker. This implies that most of the volatility in total labor input is induced along
the intensive margin. At least for the US, this is in contrast to the data. The paper
by Christoﬀel and Kuester (2008) shows that the introduction of a per-period ﬁxed costs
in the production of labor services (representing, for instance, health insurance contribu-
tions) may help to increase the elasticity of the extensive margin. Another shortcoming
of the staggered right-to-manage wage bargaining model is that even modest Calvo type
rigidities in wage bargaining entail almost constant real wage rates over the business cycle.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper develops a New Keynesian business cycle model akin to Christiano et al. (2005)
and Smets and Wouters (2003) with staggered right-to-manage wage bargaining (Trigari,
2006). We assume that, upon matching, ﬁrm-worker pairs ﬁrst bargain over the real wage
rate which is subject to staggered wage contracts. In the second step, hiring ﬁrms may
choose the number of hours per worker unilaterally. This setting implies that the real
wage rate is allocative for the number of hours per worker. Consequently, any rigidity in
the real wage rate is transmitted via the New Keynesian Phillips Curve into persistent
movements of inﬂation. This feature of the right-to-manage wage bargaining is referred
to as the “wage channel”.
The key result of our paper is that a reasonably calibrated version of the model is
able to generate persistent responses in output, inﬂation, and total labor input to both
technology and monetary policy shocks. New Keynesian models with Nash bargaining
(e.g. Walsh, 2005), in contrast, are not able to generate hump-shaped responses to mon-
etary policy shocks once capital accumulation is introduced (Heer and Maussner, 2007).
Staggered right-to-manage wage bargaining, however, increases not only the persistence
of inﬂation, but also of the real interest rate. Since we assume variable capital utilization,
this leads to a hump-shaped decline in the input of capital services. In addition to that,
matching frictions induce a sluggish response in total labor input. Consequently, we ob-
serve that the response of aggregate output reaches its minimum not impact, but just in
the second period after an innovation in monetary policy.
In response to a neutral technology shock, our model replicates a hump-shaped re-
sponse of output and a U-shaped response of inﬂation. Turning to the labor market,
we note that unemployment shows a negative impact response and then continues to
decrease sluggishly. Hours per worker, instead, exhibit a negative impact response, but
then rise for about 2 years before eventually falling. Hence, consistent with the ﬁndings
of Ravn and Simonelli (2008), we observe a positive correlation between output and total
labor input at the business cycle frequencies in response to a neutral technology shock.
Furthermore, we compare the model’s dynamic behavior when calibrated to the US
and to a European economy. We ﬁnd that the degree of price rigidity explains most
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of the diﬀerences in response to a monetary policy shock. Diﬀerences in the degree of
wage rigidity, instead, alter the dynamics of the model economy only by little. When the
economy is hit by a neutral technology shock, both price and wage rigidities turn out
to be important. Apart from that, our results indicate that matching frictions matter
primarily for the dynamics of the labor market.
On the other hand, neither the neutral technology shock, nor the monetary policy
shock is able to explain the large cyclical volatility in the unemployment rate. This im-
plies that most of the volatility in total labor input is induced along the intensive margin.
At least for the US, this is in contrast to the data. The paper by Christoﬀel and Kuester
(2008) shows that the introduction of a per-period ﬁxed costs in the production of labor
services (representing, for instance, health insurance contributions) may help to increase
the elasticity of the extensive margin. Another shortcoming of the staggered right-to-
manage wage bargaining model is that even modest Calvo type rigidities in wage bargain-
ing entail almost constant real wage rates over the business cycle.
It would be interesting to extend our analysis along two dimensions. First, we have
only investigated the impact of two structural shocks so far. Therefore, it seems to
be a natural choice to extend our analysis to a variety of other shocks. In particular,
the literature suggests examining the impact of investment-speciﬁc technology shock,
government spending shocks, or shock to the matching technology. The second step in
our research program will be to estimate the present model along the lines described by
Smets and Wouters (2007).
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Appendix 3.A The Log-Linear Model
ˆ Mt = − (N/U) ˆ Nt−1 + (1 −  )ˆ Vt ad (3.1)
ˆ qt = ˆ Mt − ˆ Vt ad (3.2)
N ˆ Nt = (1 − ρ)N ˆ Nt−1 + M ˆ Mt ad (3.3)
ˆ wt = ωw ˆ w
∗
t + (1 − ωw)ˆ wt−1 ad (3.4)
K ˆ ¯ Kt = (1 − δ)K ˆ ¯ Kt−1 + Iˆ It ad (3.8)
ˆ λc,t = [σc/((1 − ψc)(1 − βψc))]
 











rˆ rt = χaˆ xt ad (3.13)
ˆ λc,t = ˆ Rt + Et
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ˆ Qt = ˆ λk,t − ˆ λc,t ad (3.17)
ˆ Qt = Et
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t−1 + ˆ ι
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t ad (3.23)
ˆ rt = ˆ λy,t + ˆ Yt − ˆ ¯ Kt−1 − ˆ xt ad (3.24)
ˆ Wt = ˆ λy,t + ˆ Yt − ˆ Nt−1 − σhˆ ht ad (3.25)
ˆ πt =
 
ˆ πt−1 + βEt {ˆ πt+1} + [((1 − βωp)(1 − ωp))/ωp]ˆ λy,t
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ˆ wt = ˆ Wt − (1 − σh)ˆ ht ad (3.32)
ˆ J
∗
t = ˆ W
∗
t + ˆ δ
F
t − ˆ δ
W
t ad (3.34)
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t−1 + ˆ ι
r
t ad (3.40)
Y ˆ Yt = Iˆ It + C ˆ Ct + κV ˆ Vt + Gˆ Yt + Kχbˆ xt ad (3.41)
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Appendix 3.B Tables
Parameter Description Value Source
Preferences
β discount factor 0.99 Kydland and Prescott (1982)
σc relative risk aversion 1 Christiano et al. (2005)
ψc habit formation 0.65 Christiano et al. (2005)
σq money demand elasticity 6.3 Christiano et al. (2005)
ξp elasticity of substitution 6 Christiano et al. (2005)
σf hours supply elasticity 2.43 MaCurdy (1983)
Production and the Capital Market
α capital elasticity 0.36 Christiano et al. (2005)
χs investment adjustment cost 2 Christiano et al. (2005)
χb/χa utilization elasticity 1 Smets and Wouters (2007)
δ depreciation rate 0.025 Kydland and Prescott (1982)
Matching and the Labor Market
U unemployment rate 0.057 Shimer (2005)
q(θ)θ job ﬁnding rate 0.828 Shimer (2005)
ρ job destruction rate 0.05 Davis and Haltiwanger (1990)
η∗ eﬀective bargaining power 0.5 Svejnar (1986)
repb unemployment beneﬁts 0.36 OECD (2006)
κV vacancy posting costs 0.01 Hamermesh and Pfann (1996)
reph leisure gain from U 0.285 Costain and Reiter (2008)
  matching elasticity of U 0.5 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
q(θ) vacancy ﬁlling rate 0.7 van Ours and Ridder (1992)
Right-to-Manage Bargaining
σh labor eﬃciency 0.9775 Christoﬀel and Kuester (2008)
h hours per worker 1 Trigari (2006)
η “nominal” bargaining power 0.5 Nash (1953)
Government and Monetary Policy
g governmental consumption 0.18 Smets and Wouters (2007)
(PY )/M velocity of money 0.36 Christiano et al. (2005)
φr autoregressive parameter 0.8 Gertler et al. (2008)
φπ Taylor principle parameter 2.0 Gertler et al. (2008)
φy output gap parameter 0.3 Gertler et al. (2008)
Price and Wage Rigidity
ωp price rigidity 0.60 Christiano et al. (2005)
ωw wage rigidity 0.65 Christiano et al. (2005)
Stochastic Processes
ρz technology shock persistence 0.95 Cooley and Prescott (1995)
ιz technology shock sd 0.007 Cooley and Prescott (1995)
ιm monetary policy shock sd 0.002 Gertler et al. (2008)
Table 3.1: The parameterized US model economy
Parameter Description Value Source
ωF
p price rigidity 0.75 Álvarez et al. (2006)
ωF
w wage rigidity 0.83 du Caju et al. (2008)
UF unemployment rate 0.091 OECD (2008b)
qF(θF)θF job ﬁnding rate 0.212 OECD (2008a)
ρF job destruction rate 0.021 OECD (2008a,b)
repF
b unemployment beneﬁts 0.57 OECD (2006)
repF
h leisure gain from U 0.188 implied
σF
f hours supply elasticity 4.19 implied
σF
h labor eﬃciency 0.9723 implied
Table 3.2: Parameters speciﬁc to the French model economy











































Y π U N N × l l w w × l V I C
US Data
σX/σY (0.015) 0.59 7.32 0.80 0.96 0.26 0.50 0.54 9.03 2.88 0.82
ρX,Y 1.00 -0.64 -0.86 0.81 0.87 0.70 0.20 0.52 0.89 0.94 0.85
ρXt,Xt+1 0.86 0.93 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.82 0.84 0.90 0.90 0.86
US σX/σY (0.03) 0.37 0.68 0.04 1.03 0.99 0.13 1.08 0.90 2.14 0.34
Technology ρX,Y 1.00 -0.64 -0.91 0.91 0.95 0.94 0.67 0.95 0.71 0.99 0.98
Shock ρXt,Xt+1 0.94 0.86 0.92 0.92 0.87 0.87 0.97 0.93 0.89 0.95 0.93
US σX/σY (0.003) 0.29 1.50 0.09 1.24 1.18 0.03 1.18 3.06 1.74 0.41
Monetary ρX,Y 1.00 0.79 -0.89 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.54 0.99 0.99
Policy Shock ρXt,Xt+1 0.74 0.87 0.53 0.53 0.74 0.73 0.84 0.73 0.13 0.78 0.72
French Data
σX/σY (0.009) 0.98 6.19 0.58 0.72 0.56 0.84 0.65 8.18 3.01 0.90
ρX,Y 1.00 -0.49 -0.70 0.77 0.67 0.06 -0.08 -0.05 0.31 0.87 0.71
ρXt,Xt+1 0.87 0.90 0.90 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.83 0.77 0.77 0.90 0.73
France σX/σY (0.02) 0.33 0.38 0.04 1.23 1.20 0.07 1.24 1.06 2.04 0.36
Technology ρX,Y 1.00 -0.64 -0.99 0.99 0.92 0.92 0.72 0.93 0.67 0.99 0.95
Shock ρXt,Xt+1 0.95 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.87 0.86 0.97 0.87 0.92 0.96 0.95
France σX/σY (0.004) 0.12 0.52 0.00 1.24 1.21 0.00 1.21 2.76 1.79 0.38
Monetary ρX,Y 1.00 0.80 -0.96 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.56 1.00 0.66 0.99 0.99
Policy Shock ρXt,Xt+1 0.79 0.91 0.83 0.83 0.79 0.79 0.88 0.79 0.43 0.83 0.76
Table 3.3: Simulated Second Moments. For each variable, we report the relative standard deviation with respect to output σX/σY , the co-movement with
output ρX,Y , and the ﬁrst order autocorrelation ρXt,Xt+1. The percentage standard deviation of output is given in brackets. All data (1970:1-2008:4) are taken
from the OECD databases “Economic Outlook” and “Main Economic Indicators”. The time series of French vacancies starts only in 1989:1. All time series are
logged and de-trended with a Hodrick and Prescott (1997) ﬁlter 1600.
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Appendix 3.C Impulse Response Functions
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Re-Negotiated Wage Hours (Re-Negotiated Real Wage)
















Eta* Hours (Lagged Real Wage)
















Real Marginal Costs Price Level
































Capital Services Total Labor Input














Figure 3.1: Impulse responses of the US model economy to a monetary policy shock. The black solid
line represents the case ωw = 0.00. The back dashed line represents the case ωw = 0.01. The orange
solid line represents the case ωw = 0.65. The orange dashed line represents the case ωw = 0.83. Units
on the y-axis are given as percentage deviation from the steady state. Units on the x-axis correspond to
quarters.
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Average Real Wage Hours (Average Real Wage)
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Figure 3.2: Impulse responses of the US model economy to a neutral technology shock. The black solid
line represents the case ωw = 0.00. The back dashed line represents the case ωw = 0.01. The orange
solid line represents the case ωw = 0.65. The orange dashed line represents the case ωw = 0.83. Units
on the y-axis are given as percentage deviation from the steady state. Units on the x-axis correspond to
quarters.
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Average Real Wage Hours (Average Real Wage)
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Figure 3.3: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock. The red solid line represents the US model
economy. The red dashed line represents the French model economy, but prices and wages are as ﬂexible
as in the US. The blue dashed line represents the French model economy with prices as ﬂexible as in the
US. The blue solid line represents the French model economy. Units on the y-axis are given as percentage
deviation from the steady state. Units on the x-axis correspond to quarters.
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Figure 3.4: Impulse Responses to a Neutral Technology Shock. The red solid line represents the US
model economy. The red dashed line represents the French model economy, but prices and wages are as
ﬂexible as in the US. The blue dashed line represents the French model economy with prices as ﬂexible
as in the US. The blue solid line represents the French model economy. Units on the y-axis are given as
percentage deviation from the steady state. Units on the x-axis correspond to quarters.
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